Nebraska Law Review
Volume 90

Issue 4

Article 5

2012

Clarity and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the Eyes of
Their Beholders
Elizabeth Y. McCuskey
Thomas Jefferson School of Law, emcuskey@tjsl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr

Recommended Citation
Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Clarity and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the Eyes of Their Beholders,
90 Neb. L. Rev. (2013)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol90/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-4\NEB405.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

24-FEB-12

12:24

Elizabeth Y. McCuskey*

Clarity and Clarification: Grable
Federal Questions in the Eyes of
Their Beholders
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. Clarity, Clarification, and Grable Federal-Question
Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Canonization of Clarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Clarification and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Grable as Clarification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Evolution of the Grable Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Slimming Doctrinal Application in Empire . . . . .
3. Cinching Jurisdiction with Pragmatism,
Presumptions, and Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. Viewing Clarification and Implementation Through
Grable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Sample of Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Sample and Sources of Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Sample of Jurisdictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Submerged Precedent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. District Court Remand Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Westlaw Remand Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. PACER Remand Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. True Remand Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Appellate Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Circuit Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Reversal Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

502

R

504
504
508
512
513
524

R
R
R
R
R
R

528

R

531
531
533
538
539
544
545
546
547
549
549
550

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

* Faculty Fellow, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. This Article is heavily indebted
to guidance from Lee Epstein, Theodore Eisenberg, and the participants at the
fourth annual Junior Faculty Federal Courts Workshop. I owe similar debts to
wish to thank Sandra Rierson and Roberta Green for their commentary which
improved my early drafts, and Nathan Anderson, Cassandra Dorr, and the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW for their thoughtful and thorough editorial efforts. I am
grateful to Christine Santos, Noah Wald, Garrett Maugham, and Suzanne
Prochazka for their diligent research assistance. I own all remaining errors in
this work. .

501

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-4\NEB405.txt

502

unknown

Seq: 2

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

24-FEB-12

12:24

[Vol. 90:501

IV. Promoting Clarity & Clarification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Docket Searches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Explained Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Appellate Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Discretionary Circuit Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Supreme Court Supervisory Review . . . . . . . . . . . .
V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VI. Tables & Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

554
555
558
560
561
563
564
566

I. INTRODUCTION
Jurists and commentators have repeated for centuries the refrain
that jurisdictional rules should be clear.1 Behind this mantra is the
idea that clearly designed jurisdictional rules should enable trial
courts to more easily apply the law and therefore allow litigants to
more accurately predict how trial courts will rule.2 The mantra’s ultimate goal is efficiency—that trial courts not labor too long on jurisdiction and most importantly, that litigants can accurately predict the
correct forum and choose to spend their money litigating the merits of
their claim, rather than where it will be heard. Jurisdictional clarity
largely is devoted to sharpening litigants’ vision of the proper
jurisdiction.
But clarity is not costless. Bright-line jurisdictional rules have the
potential to remand the desirable cases with the undesirable ones. In
federal-question jurisdiction rules, for example, clarity is somewhat
overvalued in theory and unachieved in practice. In theory, the constitutional and statutory bases for federal-question jurisdiction prescribe simply and broadly that jurisdiction exists over “all” actions
“arising under” federal law.3 There exist compelling reasons to have
federal courts adjudicate essential federal questions, even if those
questions happen to arise through state-law claims. Therefore, many
theoretically “clear” rules, like Justice Holmes’s proposal that only
federal claims “arise under” federal law,4 would improperly trim the
intent of “arising under” jurisdiction and contravene the supposed
benefits of the federal forum. In theory, then, important substance
and systemic benefits may be unnecessarily sacrificed on the altar of
clarity.
In practice, the word “clarity” seems to work much like the word
“classy”—if you have to say it, it probably is not true, at least for federal-question jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s 2005 opinion in Gra1. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,
321 (2005) (Thomas, J. concurring); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF
EQUITY 312 (1950).
2. E.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1193 (2010).
3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
4. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).

R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-4\NEB405.txt

2012]

unknown

Seq: 3

CLARITY AND CLARIFICATION

24-FEB-12

12:24

503

ble & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &
Manufacturing5 stands as a recent example. In Grable, the unanimous Court endeavored to synthesize the numerous doctrines governing jurisdiction over state-law claims raising federal questions (or
“embedded” federal questions), and to resolve a circuit split over
whether a federal private right of action must accompany the alleged
embedded federal questions.6 The Court decided that jurisdiction did
not, in fact, require an underlying federal right of action, but that a
right of action was relevant to determinations of “substantiality” and
federalism.7 Grable thus represents the rejection of a bright-line jurisdictional rule in favor of a nuanced, discretionary one, making clear
that the jurisdictional waters should remain murky.
Grable’s rejection of a bright-line jurisdictional rule raises broader
questions about clarity’s role on federal-question jurisdiction doctrine
and whether clarity in theory translates into practice. How have district courts reacted to the Supreme Court’s clarification of doctrine
and choice of a flexible rule? Has the clarification offered litigants a
clearer picture for predicting jurisdiction?
This Article takes an initial step toward answering those questions
by first arguing that the clarity debate should focus on how jurisdictional rules appear in the eyes of their beholders and by then examining what Grable federal-question jurisdiction looks like from that
perspective—as applied in federal court precedents. Part II questions
the rationales for jurisdictional clarity and traces the gradual distillation of rules for removal jurisdiction over embedded federal-questions,
detailing how Grable purported to “clarify” the proper interpretation
of Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson8 and state a unified
jurisdictional rule.
Using Grable as an example, the Article then turns in Part II to an
empirical study on the implementation of Grable’s new “clarified” rule.
The study captures a snapshot of how federal district and appellate
courts have reacted to Grable’s attempted clarification and choice of a
nuanced rule over a bright-line one. Part III presents that study examining a sample of decisions before and after Grable. The study
identifies a mass of district court precedent “submerged” on court
dockets and uses those submerged precedents to trace trends in the
rates of remand and reversal in the years before and after the Supreme Court announced Grable. Part IV builds on these theoretical
discussions and empirical observations to describe obstacles currently
diverting clarification and to suggest some modest steps that litigants,
5.
6.
7.
8.

545 U.S. 308 (2005).
Id. at 311–12, 314.
Id. at 318.
478 U.S. 804 (1986).
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scholars, courts, and Congress might take to improve the availability
of clarifying precedents, and thereby enhance predictability.
II. CLARITY, CLARIFICATION, AND GRABLE FEDERALQUESTION JURISDICTION
Federal jurisdiction’s inherent complexity has generated hundreds
of books,9 countless articles,10 and nearly innumerable opinions.11
Yet the incantation that jurisdictional rules should be clear permeates
the field.
This Article examines clarity’s role in federal-question jurisdiction
and investigates whether current applications of federal-question jurisdictional rules are serving clarity’s underlying purposes. This Article first argues that the pursuit of jurisdictional clarity should proceed
from a litigant-centered view of the rules as applied. This Part
presents an overview of the origins, justifications, dilemmas, and applications of the mantra that “jurisdictional rules should be clear,” as
well as the clarification process at work in one particular corner of
jurisdiction: federal-question jurisdiction doctrine.
A.

Canonization of Clarity

There is a longstanding mantra among jurists and commentators
that “jurisdictional rules should be clear.”12 Efficiency and legitimacy
concerns underlie this fixation on clarity. That is, the pursuit of
“clear” jurisdictional rules seeks to promote efficiency primarily by allowing parties to spend their resources litigating the merits of their
claims instead of which court can hear them, and secondly by allowing
judges to determine jurisdiction early, easily, and accurately.13 The
9.

E.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (4th ed. 2003); JOHN F. DILREMOVAL OF CAUSES FROM STATE COURTS TO FEDERAL COURTS (3d ed. 1881);
HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973); STEVEN D.
LAW, THE JURISDICTION AND POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1852);
JAMES E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION (2006).
Including this one. As of February 11, 2012, Westlaw’s “Journals and Law Reviews” database contained 343 articles with “federal jurisdiction” in the title.
E.g., Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124
HARV. L. REV. 869 (2011); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The
Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769 (1992); Alfred Russell, Congress Should
Abrogate Federal Jurisdiction over State Corporations, 7 HARV. L. REV. 16 (1893).
E.g., J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011); Am.
Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
E.g., Grable, 545 U.S. at 321 (Thomas, J., concurring); see, e.g., Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 877 (1984) (“[L]itigants ought to be able to apply a clear test
to determine” whether they have achieved appellate jurisdiction).
As the Court recently summarized in Hertz Corp. v. Friend:
Complex jurisdictional tests complicate a case, eating up time and
money as the parties litigate, not the merits of their claims, but which
LON,

10.

11.
12.
13.
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legitimacy goal is less direct, seeking to promote a perception that federal courts are only hearing cases within their powers and are not
overreaching with jurisdictional vagaries.14 These goals thus boil
down to predictability for litigants via consistency in judicial
application.15
Yet there also exists a longstanding debate over clarity versus complexity. This debate also takes the form of rules versus standards.16
These arguments pose diverging answers to the question whether it is
more important to have an easy rule or to get the right result, in circumstances where those two values conflict. The clarity/rules side favors bright-lines and ease of application, even at the expense of underinclusion from a constitutional or ideal perspective.
Diversity jurisdiction’s amount-in-controversy requirement offers a
fairly neat example of a clarity/rules formulation.17 The line is
brightly drawn at $75,000.01; a penny less precludes jurisdiction.18
Even though many interpretive questions have arisen in applying this
bright-line rule,19 the line is drawn; it is quantitative, and it is largely

14.
15.

16.
17.

18.
19.

court is the right court to decide those claims. Complex tests produce
appeals and reversals, encourage gamesmanship, and, again, diminish
the likelihood that results and settlements will reflect a claim’s legal and
factual merits. Judicial resources too are at stake. Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it. So courts benefit from
straightforward rules under which they can readily assure themselves of
their power to hear a case.
130 S. Ct. 1181, 1193 (2010) (citations omitted); see also Navarro Savings Ass’n v.
Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 464 n.13 (1980) (“Jurisdiction should be as self-regulated as
breathing; . . . litigation over whether the case is in the right court is essentially a
waste of time and resources.”) (quoting David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and
the American Law Institute, Part I, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1968)); cf. Arbaugh v. Y
& H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (noting that courts “have an independent
obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the
absence of a challenge from any party” (citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,
526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999)).
Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 91 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011).
See Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1193 (“Simple jurisdictional rules also promote greater
predictability. Predictability is valuable to corporations making business and investment decisions. Predictability also benefits plaintiffs deciding whether to file
suit in a state or federal court.”).
E.g., Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitations on “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 309 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995).
See Martha A. Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 683, 694 (1981) (posing that, although uncertainties exist, “diversity jurisdiction generally is unlike federal question jurisdiction in that many of
its basic issues are clear and easy to apply”).
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
See, e.g., Roe v. Michelin N. Am., 613 F.3d 1058 (11th Cir. 2010) (adjudicating
whether a defendant can establish the amount in controversy requirement based
on plaintiff’s allegations for unspecified punitive damages); see also, e.g., Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA) of 2005, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711–1715 (2006).
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determinative. A less neat example of the clarity/rules formulation is
Justice Holmes’s dissenting view that federal-question jurisdiction
should include only federal claims.20 This view finds favor among the
clarity/rules crowd because it eliminates the complexities of determining whether federal issues, which may be embedded in state-law
claims, are “substantial” enough to warrant jurisdiction.21
Proponents justify the mantra as “important to conserve litigation
and judicial resources and to enhance judicial legitimacy.”22 The supposed savings and enhanced legitimacy “primarily benefit litigants
(through the exercised judgment of their lawyers) and judges.”23
On resource conservation, clear rules are thought to enable litigants to accurately predict the proper forum—or at least to have it
adjudicated quickly—and therefore spend their resources litigating
the merits of their dispute, rather than which court may hear it.24
Similarly, clear rules are thought to enable federal courts to determine jurisdiction (or the lack of it) easily and early in the proceedings—sua sponte or at a party’s urging—and thereby avoid the wasted
effort of litigating in federal court, only to have the result undone by a
jurisdictional defect unearthed or corrected on appeal.25
20. See, e.g., Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
21. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,
320 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that Justice Thomas would adopt the
Holmes Rule if an appropriate case presents itself).
22. Dodson, supra note 14, at 5; see also id. at 7–9, 10 n.27 (citing examples of Supreme Court opinions urging jurisdictional clarity “in a variety of other
contexts”).
23. Id. at 30.
24. See, e.g., Freer, supra note 16, at 342 (“Certainly, jurisdictional prescriptions
should be as clear as possible; no litigation seems as wasteful as that aimed at
whether the parties are in the right court.”); Field, supra note 17, at 683 (“One of
the first things we teach entering law students is the importance of clarity in
rules governing courts’ jurisdiction. One reason for jurisdictional rules to be clear
and simple is that litigating at length over the proper forum in which to litigate is
a poor use of limited judicial resources, expensive to the parties and to the public.
It would be better, if a case is filed in an appropriate forum, for it to be able to
proceed to the issues on the merits rather than spend time game-playing with
jurisdictional doctrines.”); see also, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181,
1193 (2010); Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737,
739–40 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Jurisdictional rules ought to be simple and precise so
that judges and lawyers are spared having to litigate over not the merits of a
legal dispute but where and when those merits shall be litigated.”); Long v.
Sasser, 91 F.3d 645, 647 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Jurisdictional rules should above all be
clear. They are meant to guide parties to their proper forums with a minimum of
fuss.”).
25. See Field, supra note 17, at 683 (explaining this phenomenon as a primary justification for clear and simple rules); see, e.g., E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident &
Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925, 930 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Nobody’s interest would be
served if we by stretching the law found jurisdiction to exist, only to have that
position ultimately rejected by the High Court.”).
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On legitimacy, the proponents of clear rules argue that the public
may perceive judicial decisions as more legitimate if made pursuant to
a clear jurisdictional authorization and a simple rule less susceptible
to strategic manipulation.26 Others have amply catalogued and critiqued this secondary goal elsewhere.27
But not everyone is content to chant the clarity mantra. The complexity/standards proponents argue that bright-line rules, while sometimes expedient, cut too far and can contravene the words of (and
intent behind) constitutional and statutory grants of jurisdiction.28
One of the mantra’s most recent and eloquent critics, Scott Dodson,
poses that clarity and simplicity are overvalued.29 Instead, Dodson
argues, “the development of jurisdictional doctrine should strive for
ways to harness the virtues of both jurisdictional clarity and jurisdictional uncertainty to maximum advantage.”30 Dodson suggests that
the concept of jurisdictional clarity “itself is inherently complex, uncertain, and difficult”31 in part because “difficulties in design, implementation, and instrumentalism all erode the ideal of clear and simple
jurisdictional rules.”32 Uncertainty has enduring value because it
“can provide opportunities for courts to better implement and accommodate the underlying policies in given circumstances.”33
Dodson’s arguments have special appeal for federal-question jurisdiction, which unlike diversity jurisdiction, focuses on the substance of
disputes and on ensuring that important questions of federal law benefit from the expertise, independence, and potential for uniformity of26. See Dodson, supra note 14, at 8–9, 45–46. The goal of judicial legitimacy invites
the mandate versus discretion debate, waged most prominently by Martin Redish
and David Shapiro. Redish has argued that abstention doctrines and exceptions
to statutory grants of jurisdiction—both created by judges—are not only bad policy, but also constitute illegitimate lawmaking by the judicial branch. Redish,
supra note 10, at 1794. Shapiro has advocated in favor of discretion as “desirable
in giving room for flexibility, fine-tuning, recognition of difference, and accommodation of unforeseen developments.” David L. Shapiro, Reflections on the Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts: A Response to “Reassessing
the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts,” 78 VA. L.
REV. 1839, 1841 (1992). Shapiro argues that courts must draw the boundaries of
jurisdiction when faced with broad, ambiguous language from Congress. David
L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 565–66 (1985).
27. See supra note 25.
28. Divining Congressional intent, or substantiality, or fairness are all examples of
“standards”—inquiries that involve complex judgments and weighing factors.
E.g., Dodson, supra note 14, at 55.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 55; see also id. at 5.
31. Id. at 14.
32. Id. at 49.
33. Id. at 53 (“These benefits are particularly true for the area of jurisdiction, in
which the courts have a strong claim to expertise.”).
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fered by Article III courts.34 For federal-question jurisdiction
warrants a rule flexible enough to allow courts to reach the right result, even if it takes more effort.
In most jurisdictional doctrine, however, clarity has assumed primacy—at least in theory, rhetoric,35 and judicial opinions.36 And, in
choosing complexity, judges may feel compelled to justify deviation
from the mantra.37 As a testament to how axiomatic the mantra has
become, Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Grable states without citation, “Jurisdictional rules should be clear.”38 And he was not the first
to do so.39
B.

Clarification and Implementation

Despite the goal of providing predictability for litigants, most of
the talk about clarity has focused on the design and inherent charac34. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 38, 312
(2005) (citing AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 164–66 (1968)).
35. Dodson, supra note 14, at 11 (“Thus, the rhetoric urging clarity and simplicity in
jurisdictional rules is alive and well in both academic and judicial circles.”).
36. E.g., J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011) (explaining that “significant expenses are incurred just on the preliminary issue of
jurisdiction” and advising that “[j]urisdictional rules should avoid these costs
whenever possible”); Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613,
621 (2002) (“Motives are difficult to evaluate, while jurisdictional rules should be
clear.”); Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988) (“The time
of appealability, having jurisdictional consequences, should above all be clear.”);
Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 349 n.26 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[J]urisdictional rules must be clear cut and cannot
turn on indefinite notions of ‘importance’ or ‘wide-ranging impact.’ ”); Heckler v.
Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 877 (1984) (“[L]itigants ought to be able to apply a clear
test to determine” whether they have achieved appellate jurisdiction); Long v.
Sasser, 91 F.3d 645, 647 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Jurisdictional rules should above all be
clear. They are meant to guide parties to their proper forums with a minimum of
fuss.”); Helm v. Resolution Trust Corp., 18 F.3d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam) (“Jurisdictional rules should be as clear and mechanical as possible.”).
37. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485–86 & n.29 (1985)
(rejecting “any talismanic jurisdictional formulas” for personal jurisdiction and
justifying the preclusion of “clear-cut jurisdictional rules” because “fair play and
substantial justice” necessarily requires complex and discretionary determinations); cf. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 821 (1988)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that “[T]here is no single, precise, all-embracing
definition” of “arising under” jurisdiction).
38. Grable, 545 U.S. at 321 (Thomas, J., concurring).
39. See, e.g., Heckler, 465 U.S. at 877 (stating without citation that “litigants ought to
be able to apply a clear test to determine” whether they have achieved appellate
jurisdiction); Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737,
739–40 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating without citation that, “The more mechanical the
application of a jurisdictional rule, the better. The chief and often the only virtue
of a jurisdictional rule is clarity.”) (citations omitted); Unique Concepts, Inc. v.
Manuel, 930 F.2d 573, 575 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating without citation that, “Jurisdictional rules should be simple and clear.”).
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teristics of rules as announced, rather than the application of those
rules and transparency in the adjudication process.40 So, despite litigants using precedent to predict jurisdiction, the focus has been on the
rule’s design, rather than its implementation process.
The clarity/complexity debate does feature the occasional recognition, based on anecdote, that implementation can muddy even rules
with clear design.41 But little attention has been paid to the possibility of producing the opposite effect—that implementation could breed
clarification of fuzzy rules.42 And even less attention has been paid to
how structural features and procedural rules might obstruct clarification in implementation.
Clarity and clarification are not identical. Clarity often refers to
inherent qualities of a rule’s design, while clarification necessarily involves a before and an after.43 A clear rule can become clearer
through clarification. Or an unclear rule can become clear through
clarification. District courts are on the “front lines” of this process,44
applying law with greater immediacy and frequency than other
courts, and doing so often without the threat of appellate review.45
Dodson and others have pointed out that implementation can muddle and complicate even ostensibly clear and simple rules.46 Implementation, though, seems to have at least the potential for the
opposite effect, too. A rule that has some (or a lot of) flexibility in its
design could be made more clear or stable through the interpretive
process.47
40. See, e.g., Field, supra note 17, at 694.
41. E.g., Dodson, supra note 14; Freer, supra note 16; John F. Preis, Jurisdiction and
Discretion in Hybrid Law Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 145 (2006).
42. But see Dodson, supra note 14 (hypothesizing that interpretive flexibility could
produce better or more stable rules over time).
43. See, e.g., Atlas Global Group, L.P. v. Grupo Dataflux, 312 F.3d 168, 177 (5th Cir.
2002) (Garza, J., dissenting), rev’d, 541 U.S. 567 (2004) (“Nor is it clear that creating exceptions to our jurisdictional rules would even lead to the conservation of
judicial resources. Instead, carving out an exception in one case merely encourages future parties to file more appeals, urging this Court to create more exceptions . . . [I]n the long run, we may waste many more judicial resources litigating
all the potential exceptions to our previously ‘clear’ jurisdictional rules.”) (citation
omitted).
44. See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empirically?, 29 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 584 (2010) (“[D]istrict court judges are on
the front line of applying the standards on 12(b)(6) motions.”).
45. Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L.
REV. 973, 977–80 (2008) (arguing that this is why district court opinions matter).
46. Dodson, supra note 14, at 5, 19, 40 (“Interpretative gloss may make an otherwise
clear and simple rule anything but. And, even if the rule and its interpretative
gloss are clear, the application could be complicated or uncertain. Obscurity in
these components of implementation can contaminate the whole doctrine.”).
47. But see Rory Ryan, Its Just Not Worth Searching for Welcome Mats with a Kaleidoscope and a Broken Compass, 75 TENN. L. REV. 659, 662, 670 (2008) (disputing
the effectiveness of this process and disputing that “the benefits outweigh the
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Precedent and a court’s explanation in implementing rules thus
play an important role in promoting clarity—or at least predictability—through clarification. Dodson argues that “uncertainty can promote stability in doctrine” by accommodating “changing
circumstances and norms . . . without disruption or distortion of precedent.”48 Accumulation of precedent, he poses, may block attempts to
reform rules, yet also may make reform unnecessary due to the deliberative and incremental development of doctrine over time.49 But
Dodson also presents the counterargument that implementation can
foil jurisdictional clarity because common-law precedent “often takes a
long time to develop clear and generally applicable tests” and may
cause “path dependence,” through stare decisis, toward undesirably
complicated rules.50
Regardless, precedent and explanation become essential to the litigant-centric view of clarity, emphasizing predictability, because precedent opinions are the data litigants, through their lawyers, use to
make those predictions. The creation of precedent enhances the predictive power for parties and their lawyers.51 Leaving aside the individual lawyer’s and judge’s skills, a prediction of the correct
jurisdiction is only as good as the data are reliable. So the reasoning
of precedent cases factors into the accuracy of any prediction. While
Dodson notes that courts offer more reasons for their rules than Congress, courts still offer reasons only rarely.52 The empirical question

48.
49.
50.
51.

52.

costs imposed by a flexible standard” for embedded federal question jurisdiction);
id. (“The flexible nature of the second-branch standard facilitates excessive delay
in the modern litigation environment. Typically, second-branch cases involve a
plaintiff suing in state court, trying to keep the case there by asserting only statecreated causes of action. Defendants typically prefer a federal forum (or, cynically, desire the opportunity for delay) and remove the case, arguing that the
presence of a federal issue satisfies the second branch. There is no judge or professor acting as a gatekeeper—rather, the defendant creates delay by simply noticing removal.”).
Dodson, supra note 14, at 53.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 27–28.
Cf. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988) (emphasizing,
in crafting a rule for appellate jurisdiction, the importance of “preservation of
operational consistency and predictability in the overall application” of the rule).
This theory of resource conservation does not, however, fully account for the strategic value in removing a case, despite an accurate prediction of slim odds for
maintaining federal jurisdiction. Empirical studies have shown that defendants
fare better in removed cases. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case
Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593–95 (1998) (noting that plaintiff
win rates are lower in removed cases). And, as Dodson has noted, “the amount of
wrangling over forum suggests that parties believe in its importance.” Dodson,
supra note 14, at 51.
See David A. Hoffman, et. al, Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85
WASH. U.L. REV. 681 (2007) (finding that a fully-reasoned decision is a relative
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arises whether jurisdictional decisions are more often reasoned. At
least in decisions to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the
order is unappealable.53 A lack of reasoned elaborations in jurisdictional decisions could prevent the clarification-through-precedent process from taking hold and clarifying murky areas.
If jurisdictional clarity focuses on litigant predictability which, in
turn, depends on application and precedent to make those predictions,
then the questions become: what does the implementation process
look like and can clarification make a difference? To tackle these big
questions, the author will start by asking them in a small segment of
jurisdictional doctrine: state-law claims raising federal issues, also
known as “embedded” federal questions.54
I chose embedded federal questions for this study because the topic
produces a relatively small number of cases, it is an area acknowledged to have fairly complex rules, and the Supreme Court issued a
clarification of the rules resolving a circuit split in its 2005 Grable
opinion,55 offering a before-and-after setting to study the rule’s implementation. Grable presented the Court with a choice between a
bright-line rule and a flexible standard. The Court’s choice of rule and
the district and appellate courts’ implementation of that choice then
presents an opportunity to examine both what the implementation
process looks like and whether the choice of a flexible rule over a
bright line can affect the outcome of jurisdictional decisions.
rarity). Dodson deals with Fred Schauer’s observation that some courts decide
some cases without explanation by distinguishing jurisdictional rulings from the
particular procedures Schauer uses as illustrations: jury verdicts, rulings on objections, and denials of certiorari. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47
STAN. L. REV. 633, 637 (1995). But Dodson does not distinguish jurisdictional
rulings from the empirical observations in Docketology. Dodson, supra note 14, at
28.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006).
54. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314
(2005). Other nicknames for this species of jurisdiction include “hybrid law”
claims, “mixed” cases, and “Grable” federal questions. See, e.g., Linda R.
Hirshman, Whose Law Is It Anyway? A Reconsideration of Federal Question Jurisdiction over Cases of Mixed State and Federal Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17, 17–18
(1984) (“hybrid cases”); Preis, supra note 41, at 148 (“hybrid”). I have selected
“embedded federal question” not only because Grable used the phrase, but also
because it is, to me, the most descriptive. Like a federal-law fossil encased in
state-law amber, the federal question is integral to the state-law claim surrounding it. Cf. Embed, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/embed?show=0&t=1326664060 (last visited Jan. 22, 2012) (defining “embed,”
as “to enclose closely in or as if in a matrix,” using the illustration of “fossils
embedded in stone”). To extract the federal question would shatter—or at least
fundamentally alter—the amber. Because Grable dealt with this precise form of
federal question most recently and, for now, most definitively, I use “Grable federal question” and “embedded federal question” interchangeably.
55. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 312, 318.
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The remainder of this Part sketches an overview of what the federal-question doctrine landscape looked like before and after Grable.
C.

Grable as Clarification

Different types of jurisdiction may warrant different levels of clarity. Diversity and appellate jurisdiction, for example, present compelling cases for bright-line rules because they primarily concern the
parties’ characteristics and the time for filing.56 Thus, their respective purposes are largely differentiated from the subject matter of the
dispute. It might make sense in those contexts to draw brighter lines
around the who and when of jurisdiction.
Federal-question jurisdiction, on the other hand, centers entirely
on the what. That is, what legal issues justify summoning the expertise, “experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues.”57 Because it pertains to the subjects
appropriate for adjudication in federal court, this existential inquiry
presents a stronger case for flexibility to achieve the right result, even
at the expense of expedience.
The evolution of federal-question jurisdiction doctrine thus reflects
the interplay of clarity, complexity, and formalist principles. The Supreme Court at one time embraced the formalist rule confining jurisdiction to federal claims,58 but maintained that rule for only three
years before rejecting it and recognizing jurisdiction over substantial
federal issues embedded in state claims.59 Rather than black-andwhite rules, the Supreme Court has looked to “common sense” principles to accommodate the “kaleidoscopic” situations that present issues
appropriate and desirable for federal adjudication.60
Though portions of the doctrine have been clarified through application over time, the kaleidoscope of commonsense approach for many
years prevented the formation of a “single, precise, all-embracing” test
for embedded federal-question jurisdiction.61 The 2005 decision in
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing at last intervened. Grable serves two primary purposes for embedded federal-question doctrine: First, the opinion weaves strands of
doctrine into a unified test, and does so unanimously; second, Grable
resolved a Circuit split over whether the alleged federal question must
have an accompanying federal right of action.62 Grable thus repre56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (appellate); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity); FED. R. APP. P. 4(a).
Grable, 545 U.S. at 312.
See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
See Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1936).
Id.
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 821 (1988) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
62. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 311–12.
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sents both the moment of clarification for the entire embedded federalquestion jurisdictional rule, and the choice between an inherently
clear rule for substantiality, versus one affording the flexibility to get
it right in each case.63 In choosing the fuzzy rule, Grable can be seen
both as a rejection of formalist principles and as a clarification in federal-question jurisdiction.
1.

Evolution of the Grable Test

Grable’s “clarification” can only fully be appreciated in context of
the choice facing the Court between varied rules for embedded federal
questions. Commentators and jurists rightly have described embedded federal-question doctrine as a “tangled corner.”64 Before attempting to pick out the relative clarity and clarifications from this tangle,
it is useful to identify the strands contributing to the knot and briefly
trace how they came to entwine and, at times, entangle.
Federal-question jurisdiction allows federal courts to decide questions of federal law to serve several general purposes: (1) to protect
federal rights and interests from hostile or inexpert state courts, (2) to
promote comity and federalism, and (3) to enhance uniformity in the
interpretation of federal law by jurists with expertise and life-tenure.65 The doctrine thereby allocates to federal courts those issues
that justify calling on “the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues.”66
Federal-question jurisdiction emanates from Article III, section 2
of the United States Constitution, which empowers federal courts to
adjudicate all cases “arising under” the Constitution, federal laws, and
treaties.67 The Judiciary Act of 1875 created federal district courts
and prescribed simply that those district courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions “arising under” the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.68 This statutory “arising under” jurisdiction parallels Article III’s constitutional arising under jurisdiction,
but has found more limited application by courts.69
63. See id. at 314, 317.
64. Almond v. Capital Props., Inc., 212 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 2000).
65. Dodson, supra note 14, at 7 (citing Barry F. Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of
Abstention, 88 MICH L. REV. 530, 550–54 (1989)).
66. Grable, 545 U.S. at 312 (2005) (citing AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 164–66 (1968)).
67. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
69. See, e.g., Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co. 358 U.S. 354, 378–80 (1959)
(“The Act of 1875 is broadly phrased, but it has been continuously construed and
limited in the light of the history that produced it, the demands of reason and
coherence, and the dictates of sound judicial policy which have emerged from the
Act’s function as a provision in the mosaic of federal judiciary legislation. It is a
statute, not a Constitution, we are expounding.”); see also, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v.
Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494–95 (1983) (explaining that, despite
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Although the constitutional and statutory bases for federal-question jurisdiction have remained unaltered since they were written,70
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of those bases has evolved significantly and inconsistently in the subsequent centuries of federal-question jurisprudence. Specifically, the proclaimed test for when a statelaw case raises a jurisdictional federal question has morphed and oscillated over time.71
Osborn v. Bank of the United States represents a convenient pole
for marking the most expansive articulation of federal-question jurisdiction: that Congress may confer federal-question jurisdiction over
cases with an “ingredient” of federal law.72 At the opposite pole, Justice Holmes most famously expressed the minimal view of federalquestion jurisdiction: that arising under jurisdiction includes only
those cases brought as federal-law claims.73 But Justice Holmes en-

70.
71.

72.

73.

nearly identical language, the Court “never has held that statutory ‘arising
under’ jurisdiction is identical to Art. III ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.”).
See U.S. CONST. art. III; 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
See Almond v. Capital Props. Inc., 212 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme
Court has periodically affirmed [embedded federal question] jurisdiction in the
abstract . . . , occasionally cast doubt upon it, rarely applied it in practice, and left
the very scope of the concept unclear. Perhaps the best one can say is that this
basis endures in principle but should be applied with caution and various qualifications.”) (citations omitted). Compare City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons,
522 U.S. 156, 164 (1997) (recognizing jurisdiction “if a well-pleaded complaint
established that [plaintiffs] right to relief under state law requires resolution of a
substantial question of federal law”) (citation omitted), Smith v. Kan. City Title &
Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921) (extending jurisdiction to cases in which it
“appears from the [complaint] that the right to relief depends upon the construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that such
federal claim is not merely colorable, and rests upon a reasonable foundation”),
and Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 741, 749 (1824) (holding that Congress may
confer federal question jurisdiction over cases with an “ingredient” of federal
law), with Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)
(“A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”), and Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (restricting federal question jurisdiction to cases in which the federal law implicated confers a right of action). See
generally Ryan, supra note 47, 662–70 (outlining the vacillation and changes in
the test for embedded federal question since the Holmes Rule and concluding that
“[t]he costs associated with such a fuzzy jurisdictional inquiry simply outweigh
the benefits”).
Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823 (holding that Congress may confer federal question jurisdiction over cases with an “ingredient” of federal law). Judge Friendly contemplated an even more “extreme[ ]” maximum model of federal-question
jurisdiction, embracing the “full sweep of constitutional power” to include federal
defenses in civil and criminal cases and removal power for plaintiff or defendant
after assertion of a federal defense or counterclaim. FRIENDLY, supra note 2, at
11–13. This hypothetical remained a hypothetical, and Judge Friendly dismissed
the idea as “principled but unwise.” Id. at 13.
E.g., Am. Well Works, 241 U.S. at 260 (“A suit arises under the law that creates
the cause of action.”); Smith, 255 U.S. at 214 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Judge
Friendly contemplated an even more “extreme[ ]” minimal model of federal-ques-
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ded up dissenting in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., which
stated the Supreme Court’s earliest and most-often-quoted test for jurisdiction over embedded federal questions:
The general rule is that, where it appears from the bill or statement of the
plaintiff that the right to relief depends upon the construction or application
of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that such federal claim is
not merely colorable, and rests upon a reasonable foundation, the District
Court has jurisdiction under this provision.74

In its 2005 Grable opinion, the Supreme Court staked out a position between the two poles of “jurisdiction over federal issues embedded in state-law claims between nondiverse parties,” again rejecting
the Holmes prohibition, but also refusing to “open[ ] federal courts to
any state action embracing a point of federal law.”75 The compromise
position articulated in Grable wove various doctrinal strands together
into a four-element test.76 When determining jurisdiction over embedded federal questions, the Grable test is, “does a state-law claim (1)
necessarily raise a stated federal issue, (2) actually disputed and (3)
substantial, (4) which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”77
The Supreme Court’s 1986 opinion in Merrell Dow set the stage for
Grable.78 In Merrell Dow, the majority emphasized that the importance of a federal right of action accompanying an alleged federal
question “cannot be overstated.”79 During the nineteen years after
Merrell Dow, the courts of appeals split over whether it actually could

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

79.

tion jurisdiction, eliminating “general federal question jurisdiction” and replacing
it with limited exceptions for admiralty, maritime, bankruptcy, patent, and suits
against the United States. FRIENDLY, supra note 2, at 13. Judge Friendly similarly dismissed this minimum model as “principled but unwise.” Id.
Smith, 255 U.S. at 199.
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314
(2005).
Id. at 321.
Id. at 314(numbers added)
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Abbott Labs., 390 F. Supp. 2d 815, 820 (W.D. Wis. 2005)
(“Defendants’ argument relies on a recent Supreme Court decision, [Grable], but
the proper starting point for analysis is a case decided twenty years earlier [Merrell Dow].”) (citation omitted). Previous authors have deftly handled the detailed
history of federal-question jurisdiction, so I have presented only a summary here.
See, e.g., Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 55
(2008); see also, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, Grable on the Ground: Mitigating Unchecked Jurisdictional Discretion, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1153, 1160–76 (2011)
(focusing on Grable through the history of federal-question jurisdiction).
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 812 (1986). As Erwin
Chemerinsky succinctly described the state of embedded federal-question jurisdiction under Merrell Dow: “a case arises under federal law if it is apparent from
the fact of the plaintiff’s complaint . . . [that] plaintiff’s cause of action is based on
state law [and] that a federal law that creates a cause of action is an essential
component of the plaintiff’s claim.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 5.2, at 288.
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be overstated—namely, whether Merrell Dow “always requires a federal cause of action as a condition for exercising federal-question jurisdiction.”80 Grable granted certiorari to address the split.81
Grable presented a neat and tidy package for resolving the split
because the alleged federal question was “the only issue”82 in the case,
which involved a narrow point of tax law relating to form of notice.83
To satisfy delinquent federal taxes, the IRS seized property owned by
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc.84 The seizure necessitated notice
under a federal tax law provision.85 Grable received actual notice by
certified mail and the sale went forward.86 Darue Engineering &
Manufacturing bought the property at the sale and received a quitclaim deed from the government.87 Five years later, Grable brought
an action in Michigan state court for quiet title, contending that a
faulty form of notice invalidated the quitclaim deed issued to Darue.88
Specifically, Grable claimed that the federal tax law notice provision
required personal service and that service he received by certified
mail was improper.89
80. Grable, 545 U.S. at 311–12; see also, Bracey v. Bd. of Educ. of Bridgeport, 368
F.3d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 2004) (describing the split). Compare, e.g., Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 764 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Merrell Dow interpreted the word ‘substantial’ in this phrase to mean a congressional choice to include a private right of
action in favor of plaintiffs.”), with Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799,
806 (4th Cir. 1996), and Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 54 (2d Cir.
1996) (“Although . . . cases in this circuit have not read Merrell Dow categorically
to preclude federal question jurisdiction in the absence of a private remedy for
violation of the relevant federal law, [ ] the existence vel non of such a private
right of action is the starting point for our inquiry into the substantiality of the
federal questions involved in a lawsuit.”) (citations omitted). Chemerinsky also
highlighted the ambiguity Merrell Dow engendered, making “a more precise
statement [of the test] impossible” without “additional clarification” from the Supreme Court. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 5.2, at 288.
81. Grable, 545 U.S. at 311–12.
82. As an aside, the Court observed that, in Grable, the federal issue “appear[ed] to
be the only legal or factual issue contested in the case.” Id. at 315. Notably, this
“only issue” observation does not appear in the part of the opinion outlining the
law. It’s only proper use seems to be as a point of emphasis on really necessary
federal issues, not as a prerequisite to satisfying the jurisdictional test. The singularity of the issue has, unfortunately, attracted more attention than it warrants, with erroneous results. See generally Jennifer E. Fairbairn, Comment,
Keeping Grable Slim: Federal Question Jurisdiction and the Centrality Test, 58
EMORY L.J. 977, 1006 (2009) (identifying a common district court error in applying Grable as “overemphasis on the federal issue as the only disputed issue”).
83. Grable, 545 U.S. at 310.
84. Id. at 310.
85. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C § 6335) (2000)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 311.
89. Id.
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Darue removed the case to federal court, arguing the title’s validity
turned on the interpretation of the federal tax law’s notice provision.90
Grable moved to remand. The district court denied remand,91 explaining that Grable’s claim posed a “significant question of federal
law” and the absence of a federal right of action to enforce the claim
did not prevent exercise of jurisdiction.92
The district court ultimately granted summary judgment for
Darue, holding the federal notice provision required personal service,
but substantial compliance sufficed.93 Grable appealed and the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the jurisdictional and merits rulings.94 In adjudicating Grable’s jurisdictional arguments, the Sixth Circuit cited the wellpleaded complaint rule95 and a three-part test “synthesized” by circuit
courts from the “long history of Supreme Court guidance:” “[A] federal
question may arise out of a state law case or controversy if the plaintiff asserts a federal right that (1) involves a substantial question of
federal law; (2) is framed in terms of state law; and (3) requires interpretation of federal law to resolve the case.”96
After granting certiorari, Justice Souter framed the question as,
“whether want of a federal cause of action to try claims of title to land
obtained at a federal tax sale precludes removal to federal court of a
state action with nondiverse parties raising a disputed issue of federal
title law.”97 Justice Souter’s answer for the unanimous Court ultimately was “no” and the Court held “the national interest in providing
a federal forum for federal tax litigation is sufficiently substantial to
support the exercise of federal question jurisdiction over the disputed
90. Id.
91. From the District Court docket, it appears that the Court held a hearing on
Darue’s motion to remand on April 2, 2011 and issued its two-page order denying
the motion that same day. W.D. Mich. Civil Docket, at entries for April 2, 2001,
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 694
(W.D. Mich. 2002) (1:01-CV-37-DWM). The District Court published its summary judgment opinion. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg.,
Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 694, 697 (W.D. Mich. 2002).
92. Grable, 545 U.S. at 311 (quoting district court hearing transcript).
93. “Inasmuch as plaintiff undisputedly received actual notice of the seizure of its
Eaton Rapids property by certified mail; was afforded ample opportunity to be
present at the tax sale and bid on the property; and has not even argued that it
suffered any prejudice as a result of the IRS’s failure to personally deliver notice,
the Court is satisfied that § 6335(a) was substantially complied with.” Grable &
Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 694,
697 (W.D. Mich. 2002).
94. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 377 F.3d 592 (6th Cir.
2004).
95. Id. at 594 (“[A] federal question ‘must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff’s statement of his own claim.’ ” (quoting Taylor v. Anderson,
234 U.S. 74, 75 (1914))).
96. Id. at 595 (citing Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 759 (6th Cir.
2000)).
97. Grable, 545 U.S. at 310.
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issue on removal, which would not distort any division of labor between the state and federal courts, provided or assumed by
Congress.”98
The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit and performed its
own synthesis of the “long history” of its “guidance” on federal-question jurisdiction,99 including “the commonsense notion that a federal
court ought to be able to hear claims recognized under state law that
nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a
federal forum offers on federal issues.”100 Although acknowledging
that it had yet to state a “ ‘single, precise, all-embracing’ ” test for federal-question jurisdiction over federal issues embedded in state-law
claims between nondiverse parties,101 the Grable Court synthesized
precedent along four major doctrinal strands: (1) “does a state-law
claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue,” that is (2) “actually disputed” and (3) “substantial,” and which (4) “a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of
federal and state judicial responsibilities.”102 Grable appears to have
arranged its elements from least controversial to most.
The first strand, “necessary,” traces back to Smith’s statement allowing jurisdiction where the right to relief under a state law claim
“‘depends upon the construction or application of [federal law].’ ”103
The well-pleaded complaint rule additionally requires that the issue
appear in the plaintiff’s complaint and not simply as a necessary defense.104 Thus necessity appears first in the Grable synthesis as a
98. Id.
99. Compare id. at 312–14 (containing the Supreme Court’s synthesis of precedent),
with Grable, 377 F.3d at 595 (containing the Sixth Circuit’s “synthesis” of the
“long history of Supreme Court guidance”).
100. Grable, 545 U.S. at 312 (citing AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 164–66 (1968)).
101. Id. at 314 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 821
(1988) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
102. Id. at 314.
103. Id. at 312–13 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust
Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921)). By the time the Court decided Smith in 1921, this
“necessity” factor had already become a “classic” in federal-question doctrine.
Nearly a century before Smith, Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia prescribed constitutional federal-question jurisdiction whenever the “correct decision
depends on” a question of federal law. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,
379 (1821). Three years later, the Marshall Court explained that this dependence itself provided “a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction” over federal questions. Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824).
104. Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112–13 (1936) (“To bring a case within
the statute, a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United
States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff’s cause of action. . . . [A]nd the controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint,
unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal.”).
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classic feature of federal-question jurisdiction, with the weight of consistent precedent behind it.105
The second doctrinal strand, “ to consider is whether such issue is
actually disputed,”106 recognizes that a question of federal law must
be more than present and necessary to the state claim’s resolution.107
The disputed element occupies the second position in Grable’s test,
owing to the “constant refrain” that jurisdiction “demands . . . a contested federal issue.”108
The third doctrinal strand, substantiality, requires that, in addition to being actually disputed and disputable, the alleged question
itself must be substantial, implicating a “serious federal interest in
claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.”109
Substantiality doctrine is historic, but features little consensus over
the years about its meaning.
Grable cited Justice Cardozo’s 1936 statement in Gully v. First National Bank that the test must involve “ ‘a selective process which
picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones
aside,’” while encompassing a “ ‘common-sense accommodation of
judgment to [the] kaleidoscopic situations’ ” presenting embedded federal issues.110 The Court cited three cases as evidence of a “constant
refrain” of substantiality:111 City of Chicago v. International College of
Surgeons,112 Merrell Dow,113 and Franchise Tax Board v. Construc105. This hoary commitment to the well-pleaded complaint rule, however, is not
wholly without controversy today, as scholars and jurists continue to promote the
Holmes Rule’s virtues. E.g., Grable, 545 U.S. at 320 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(supposing that, “[i]n an appropriate case,” he would be willing to consider adopting the Holmes view of jurisdiction); see also, e.g., Preis, supra note 41 (supporting the use of bright-line rules in resolving some federal jurisdiction questions).
See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 277–78, 282 (noting that the “wellpleaded complaint rule has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court” and is “firmly established” despite valid criticisms of the rule).
106. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 313.
107. An early case, Shulthis v. McDougal, required that the state-law claim not simply
involve a question about federal law, but “really and substantially involve[ ] a
dispute” over federal law. Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912). Shulthis denied federal-question jurisdiction over a state quiet title claim because
there was not “any controversy respecting the[ ] validity, construction, or effect”
of the federal statutes involved. Id. at 570; see Grable, 545 U.S. at 316 n.3.
108. Grable, 545 U.S. at 313.
109. Id. at 313.
110. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109,
117–18 (1936)).
111. Id.
112. 522 U.S. 156 (1997). Justice O’Connor, writing for the 7–2 majority in College of
Surgeons, cited Franchise Tax Board’s test, as well as Gully’s well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. at 164. College of Surgeons, however, did not further develop the
“substantiality” rule, largely because the federal questions at issue involved constitutional claims. Id. In this definition-by-example for “substantiality,” the
Court had no occasion to consider the reach of Merrell Dow’s right-of-action
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tion Laborers Vacation Trust.114 While each case did impose a substantiality requirement, each articulated it differently.
In 1986, Merrell Dow added a confounding factor to the definition
of substantial: a federal remedy in the statute underlying the alleged
federal issue.115 Adjudicating embedded federal-question jurisdiction
over state tort claims allegedly raising issues about the Federal Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act’s labeling provisions, Justice Stevens’s opinion
for the 5-4 Court held that the lack of a private right of action under
the FDCA was “tantamount” to a conclusion that the issue was not
substantial enough to be in federal court.116 Use of the word tantamount, commonly defined as “equivalent in value, significance, or effect,”117 rendered the absence of a federal remedy equivalent to
insufficient substantiality under a literal reading of Merrell Dow.118
The circuit courts split in their interpretation of Merrell Dow’s
meaning, with several circuits applying the literal reading to require a
private right of action accompany the alleged federal question and the
Fourth Circuit holding that a private right of action was not required.119 Grable rejected the literal reading and upheld the Fourth
Circuit’s interpretation.120
Thus, according to Grable’s reading of precedent, state-law claims
with embedded federal issues arise under federal law when the issues
are necessary to adjudicating the complaint, actually disputed, and
implicate a substantial federal interest in resort to a federal forum.121
With the exception of the malleable definition for substantial, the test
seems simple enough.

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

119.

120.
121.

equivalent. As Grable noted, and Merrell Dow “suggested,” federal constitutional
questions occupy a more “substantial” sphere than federal statutory questions,
with constitutional questions “the more likely ones to reach the level of substantiality that can justify federal jurisdiction.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 320 n.7.
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
463 U.S. 1 (1983).
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814.
Id.
Tantamount Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-wester.
com/dictionary/tantamount (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
In a footnote, the Merrell Dow majority took up the notion that “arising under”
jurisprudence “can best be understood as an evaluation of the nature of the federal interest at stake.” 478 U.S. at 814 n.12. The federal interest needed to be
“really” federal, or “substantial” and the absence of a federal right of action
equaled the absence of “substantiality.” Id.
Compare, e.g., Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring a
parallel federal private right of action for federal-question jurisdiction), with
Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799, 806 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding federal-question jurisdiction without an accompanying federal private action).
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 311–12 &
n.2 (2005).
Id. at 313.
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The final doctrinal strand, however, involves balancing federalism
and comity, complicated “considerations [that] ha[d] kept [the Court]
from stating a ‘single, precise, all-embracing’ test” before 2005.122
Grable saw in Franchise Tax Board and Merrell Dow’s discussions of
federalism the imposition of “a possible veto” on exercise of jurisdiction in embedded-question cases otherwise satisfying the “arising
under” test.123 Merrell Dow had “emphasized . . . sensitive judgments
about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system” in
any jurisdictional adjudication.124 The Court echoed Franchise Tax
Board’s “forceful[ ] reiterat[ion]” of the “need for prudence and restraint in the jurisdictional inquiry.”125 Expressing concern over the
“‘increased volume of federal litigation’ ” and noting the importance of
adhering to “ ‘legislative intent,’ ” Merrell Dow thought it improbable
that Congress, having made no provision for a federal cause of action,
would have meant to welcome any state-law tort case implicating federal law “solely because the violation of the federal statute is said to
[create] a ‘rebuttable presumption’ [of negligence] . . . under state
law.”126 Merrell Dow warned that, “exercising federal jurisdiction
over state claims resting on federal mislabeling and other statutory
violations would . . . have heralded a potentially enormous shift of traditionally state cases into federal courts.”127
Although Grable correctly held that federal-question jurisdiction
could not properly require a federal right of action, Grable maintained
the jurisdictional significance of caseload management. Grable stated
the floodgates hysteria in federalist terms, emphasizing deference to
the legislative branch and requiring a “sensitive judgment” by district
courts about the “congressionally approved balance of federal and
state judicial responsibilities.”128
122. Id. at 314 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 821
(1988) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
123. Id. at 313–14.
124. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986); see, e.g., Osborn
v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (Johnson, J., dissenting); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 317 (1996); see
also Toby J. Stern, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates of Litigation,” 6
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377 (2003) (criticizing the use of the floodgates argument by
federal courts to avoid taking on a case). In 1973, for example, Judge Friendly
cautioned that “the inferior federal courts now have more work than they can
properly do—including some work they are not institutionally fitted to do.”
FRIENDLY, supra note 2, at 3–4. According to Friendly, the ALI’s 1969 Division
study did not even “reflect the proper amount of alarm” over caseloads because it
began in 1961, “before the tidal wave of litigation that has engulfed the federal
courts.” Id. at 4; see Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810.
125. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810 (citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 20).
126. Id. at 811–12 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353, 377 (1982)).
127. Grable 545 U.S. at 319 (2005).
128. Id. at 309.
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Grable then instructed that, in addition to the test of the federal
question, “there must always be an assessment of any disruptive portent in exercising federal jurisdiction.”129 This federalism “veto,”
adopted in Grable, instructs courts to remand if exercising jurisdiction
over a necessary, disputed, substantial federal question would alter
the “division of labor” Congress intended to maintain between state
and federal courts.130 In short, if exercising the jurisdiction conferred
by Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1875 would “attract[ ] a horde”
of newly-removed cases to the federal courts, then courts should abstain from jurisdiction.131 As Andrew Bradt argued, this balancing
factor functions effectively as an abstention doctrine.132
Grable’s encapsulation of precedent therefore presented the new
test as, “does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue,
actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”133
Applying the newly-minted test, Grable held the federal court
properly exercised jurisdiction.134 The federal government’s “strong
interest” in tax-collection matters rendered the notice provision “an
important issue of federal law that sensibly belongs in a federal court”
to “vindicate” federal administrative action using “judges used to federal tax matters,” thereby passing the substantiality (and practicality)
test.135 Further, jurisdiction over this essential, disputed, and substantial federal question would “portend only a microscopic effect on
the federal-state division of labor” because “it will be the rare state
title case that raises a contested matter of federal law.”136
Grable upheld jurisdiction and found substantiality despite the
fact that everyone agreed the federal tax statute at issue contained no
private right of action.137 The Court then had to decide what to do
about Merrell Dow’s reliance on a similar hole as tantamount to
insubstantiality.
129. Id. at 314.
130. Id. But see 17th St. Assocs. v. Markel Int’l Ins. Co., 373 F. Supp. 2d 584,
594 (E.D. Va. 2005) (“The decision not to exercise jurisdiction raises ‘significant
federalism concerns’ at least as important as the decision to exercise jurisdiction. . . . The right to remand and the right to remove are of equal import: while
certain plaintiffs pleading claims based on state law are entitled to air their
grievances before a state tribunal, certain defendants are equally entitled to
mount their defense in a federal forum.”).
131. Grable, 545 U.S. at 314.
132. See Bradt, supra note 77, at 1160–76.
133. Grable, 545 U.S. at 314.
134. Id. at 314–15.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 315, 319.
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The Grable Court answered by leaving Merrell Dow technically
standing, but cabining its reasoning with a reading lesson. Grable ignored the tantamount language in Merrell Dow, explaining the opinion “cannot be read whole as overturning decades of precedent, as it
would have done by effectively adopting the Holmes dissent in
Smith . . . and converting a federal cause of action from a sufficient
condition . . . into a necessary one.”138 The Grable Court went out of
its way to leave Merrell Dow intact, despite reaching the opposite conclusion regarding the necessity of a private right of action.139 The
Court clarified that Merrell Dow, “should be read in its entirety as
treating the absence of a federal private right of action as evidence
relevant to, but not dispositive of, the ‘sensitive judgments about congressional intent’ that § 1331 requires.”140 Grable made the absence
of a private right of action somewhat important in sorting out substantiality, and primarily important in divining “clue[s]” to Congress’s
intended balance of federal and state responsibilities.141
Put more colorfully by Justice Souter, “The Court [in Merrell Dow]
saw the missing cause of action not as a missing federal door key, always required, but as a missing welcome mat, required in the circumstances when exercising federal jurisdiction . . . would have attracted
a horde of original filings and removal cases.”142
Whatever its inherent vices and virtues, Grable thus wove the existing lines of doctrine together as elements in a “single” and “all-encompassing” test, while “clarifying” that Merrell Dow did not require a
federal right of action for substantiality. Whether Grable hit its mark
for crafting a “precise” test is more debatable. Grable presented the
Court with the opportunity to choose a bright-line rule, and the Court
unanimously rejected it. The unanimous test values flexibility and
discretion—“substantiality,” “balance,” and even “necessary” all involve sensitive judgments about the pleading’s meaning and Congressional intent. At worst, Grable muddied the waters and ossified the
importance of federalist balancing, which relies so heavily on discretion as to warrant classification as a new abstention doctrine.143 At
138. Id. at 317; cf. id. at 320 (Thomas, J., concurring) (supposing that, “[i]n an appropriate case,” he would be willing to consider adopting the Holmes view of
jurisdiction).
139. Id. at 317.
140. Id. at 318; see also Wisconsin v. Abbott Labs., 390 F. Supp. 2d 815, 821 (W.D.
Wis. 2005) (describing how Grable “backed away from [Merrell Dow’s] approach”);
cf. id. (“The [Grable] Court stated further that its holding did not overrule the
decision in Merrell Dow. Rather, it characterized Merrell Dow as consistent with
the framework set out in Grable.”).
141. Grable, 545 U.S. at 318.
142. Id.
143. See Bradt, supra note 78; see, e.g., Abbott Labs., 390 F. Supp. 2d at 824 (concluding that the complaint necessarily presented a substantial, disputed question of
federal law, but remanding based on the balancing factor “[b]ecause this case
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best, Grable clarified the substantiality rule as between two possible
meanings, and chose the more flexible of the two, requiring more inquiry, discretion, and judgment in determining what issues belong in
the federal courts. This suggests that, while the formalist ideal of
bright-line rules for clarity and expediency has retained its gravitas,
the allure of flexibility and discretion to make the hard calls endures.
While prizing the expedience of hard-and-fast rules, courts want to
reserve the power to decide issues flexibly when needed.
The clarity debate at times oversimplifies the dueling questions
whether it is more important to make it clear or to get it right. With a
question whose answer determines, at the outset of a case, which forum and rules will apply, and whether the federal courts may serve
their purpose, it is more important to get it right.144 And Grable proceeded from that calculation in crafting its unified test. In clarifying
that the malleable definition of substantiality prevails, Grable gave
the federal courts an escape hatch to reach the merits of those cases
raising important questions of federal law that would benefit from
uniform interpretation, but which do not have a federal cause of action
underlying them. Grable is good145—or at the very least, useful—for
studying the implementation of clear versus fuzzy jurisdictional rules.
2.

Slimming Doctrinal Application in Empire

The evolution of the jurisdictional test is, however, not the only
force at play in the study of jurisdictional clarity and clarification.
Any examination of the world before and after Grable announced its
test must account for the contributions and modifications of implementing opinions. One year after Grable, the Supreme Court took the
opportunity to comment on its decision in Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh.146 In applying Grable, Empire coated the test
with interpretive gloss. Empire presented the question whether an
insurance carrier’s claim for benefits reimbursement from an indoes not implicate an overriding federal interest and because removal would disturb the balance of judicial responsibilities between state and federal courts”).
144. The importance magnifies when considering that an erroneous decision against
jurisdiction is unappealable, see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), and an erroneous decision
for jurisdiction wastes resources if ultimately reversed, or affects the opportunity
for recovery if not reversed. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 593–95
(illustrating that plaintiff win rates are lower in removed cases). But see Ryan,
supra note 47, at 670 (arguing that “the benefits outweigh the costs imposed by a
flexible standard” for embedded federal question jurisdiction).
145. See Rory Ryan, No Welcome Mat, No Problem?: Federal Question Jurisdiction After Grable, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 621, 622 (Spring 2006) (concluding that Grable
“admirably answers more questions than it creates”).
146. 547 U.S. 677 (2006). Empire examined arising under jurisdiction over a suit initially filed by the plaintiff in federal court, rather than removed there by the
defendant. Id. at 683.

R
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sured’s settlement proceeds fell under § 1331,147 addressing a circuit
split.148 The Empire majority’s commentary on Grable, while answering this question, put Grable in its place without altering its doctrine.
In Empire, a federal employee, Mr. McVeigh, enrolled in a federal
employees’ health insurance plan, was fatally injured, and his widow
sued the alleged tortfeasor who caused the injury in state court and
received a settlement.149 The private insurer, who contracted with
the federal government to offer insurance pursuant to a federal statute, had notice of the widow’s tort suit, but chose to be a spectator,
rather than a participant.150 After settlement, the insurer sued McVeigh’s estate in federal court seeking reimbursement from the settlement funds for the full amount of benefits paid.151 Empire asserted
federal jurisdiction based on a federal contractual right and alternatively that the insurance plan itself constituted federal law.152 The
district court granted Mrs. McVeigh’s motion to dismiss based on lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction and a divided panel of the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal.153
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion affirmed the dismissal, holding
jurisdiction did not exist on any of the three bases considered: (1) federal common law, (2) federal contractual rights, and (3) Grable federal-question jurisdiction.154 After dealing with the first two bases,
Empire turned to Grable as a last-resort jurisdictional argument
raised by the United States, participating as amicus curiae.155 Although Empire did not alter Grable’s test in any way, Justice Ginsburg’s descriptions of—and commentary about—Grable seemed to put
a finger on the scale toward limited exercise of jurisdiction.
First, Empire repeated Grable’s observation that the federal tax
issue in Grable appeared to be “ ‘the only . . . issue contested in the
147. Id. at 683.
148. Id. at 689. The Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits upheld federal jurisdiction
over insurers’ reimbursement claims, and the Third Circuit rejected jurisdiction.
Id.
149. Id. at 688
150. Id. at 684.
151. Id. at 683. The enrollee’s widow, Mrs. McVeigh, had agreed to put $100,000 of
her $3,175,000 settlement in escrow to reimburse Empire the $157,309 it spent
on coverage, less the attorneys’ fees and litigation costs of bringing the tort suit.
Id. at 687–88. But Empire filed suit in federal court seeking the entire amount
paid, without an offset for the litigation fees and costs. Id. at 688.
152. Id. at 688.
153. Id. at 688–89.
154. Id. at 690, 701. The first basis, federal common law, was not raised by the parties, but instead by Justice Breyer’s dissent, in which Justices Kennedy, Souter,
and Alito joined. Id. at 690. The parties and amici asserted the other two bases.
Id.
155. Id. at 699.
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case.’”156 The proper reading of this “only issue” characteristic in
Grable, however, seems to be that it underscores—but does not create—the necessity of the federal question to the case. And, incidentally, it made Grable a desirable candidate for certiorari.
Second, Empire contrasted the “fact-bound and situation-specific”
issue of how much to reimburse Empire’s plan with Grable’s federal
tax question, which was “both dispositive of the case
and . . . controlling in numerous other cases.”157 While Grable’s federal tax question presented “a nearly ‘pure issue of law’ ” that “ ‘could
be settled once and for all and thereafter would govern numerous tax
sale cases,’ ”158 Empire involved a fact-fight about how much reimbursement was proper.159 This “dispositive and controlling”—or
“pure issue of law”—commentary can only properly be read as one consideration in Grable’s substantiality element, not as an additional requirement for jurisdiction.
Empire raises this “dispositive and controlling” aspect near its discussion of substantiality and cites only to a Grable passage indirectly
linking substantiality with the hope of uniformity.160 Thus, Empire
looked to the dividends reaped from any federal court effort to answer
the alleged federal question, favoring those cases that would best and
most quickly promote uniformity in federal law. As the D.C. Circuit
recently noted, under Empire “[f]ederal jurisdiction is favored” in
cases presenting “ ‘a nearly pure issue of law . . . that could be settled
once and for all and thereafter would govern numerous . . . cases.’ ”161
And, “[c]onversely, federal jurisdiction is disfavored for cases that are
156. Id. at 700 (alteration in original) (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v.
Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 315 (2005)). As noted earlier, this observation
has led to erroneous and unwarranted focus in some district court opinions. See
generally Jennifer E. Fairbairn, Comment, Keeping Grable Slim: Federal Question Jurisdiction and the Centrality Test, 58 EMORY L.J. 977, 1006 (2009) (identifying a common district court error in applying Grable as “overemphasis on the
federal issue as the only disputed issue”).
157. Empire, 547 U.S. at 700–01 (citing Grable, 545 U.S. at 313).
158. Id. at 700 (quoting RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 65 (5th ed. Supp. 2005)).
159. Id. at 701. The Court also dismissed the alleged federal question of whether and
to what extent the reimbursement should account for attorney’s fees as “best
positioned” for resolution in a state court and therefore afoul of Grable’s “balancing” element. Id.
160. Compare id. at 700, with Grable, 545 U.S. at 313 (“It has in fact become a constant refrain in [federal-question] cases that federal jurisdiction demands not
only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one, indicating a serious federal
interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.”),
and id. at 312 (explaining that “substantial questions of federal law” embedded in
state-law claims “justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues”).
161. Bender v. Jordan, 623 F.3d 1128, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Empire, 547 U.S.
at 700) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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‘fact-bound and situation-specific’ or which involve substantial questions of state as well as federal law.”162
But Empire’s last words about Grable offer the most unsubtle
nudge of all. Despite the United States’ “overwhelming interest” in
the health and welfare of federal employees, Justice Ginsburg concluded that Empire could not be “squeezed into the slim category Grable exemplifies.”163 Merrell Dow had already opined that the “vast
majority” of federal-question jurisdiction cases are Holmes Rule cases
in which federal law creates the cause of action.164 Grable similarly
explained that, while § 1331 is “usually invoked by plaintiffs pleading
a federal cause of action,” embedded federal questions in state-law
claims represent “another longstanding, if less frequently encountered, variety of ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.”165 Again, although not
part of the test, Empire’s evocative imagery of “squeezing” embedded
federal-question cases into a “slim category” colors how Grable is
viewed, and which way close cases should go.166 Empire represents
not a modification of Grable’s rule, but rather a clarification of Grable’s scope in application. Empire’s nuance on Grable’s rule nudges
toward narrow application.

162. Id. at 1130 (quoting Empire, 547 U.S. at 701).
163. Empire, 547 U.S. at 701.
164. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (citation
omitted).
165. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312
(2005).
166. As of July 1, 2011, more than sixty decisions in Westlaw have quoted Empire’s
“slim category” phrasing. That list includes six appellate opinions, from the
Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, all of which held
jurisdiction lacking. See Kalick v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 372 F. App’x 317, 320 (3d
Cir. 2010) (denying federal-question jurisdiction and noting that Empire “emphasized that Grable & Sons exemplified a ‘slim category’ ”); Cent. Iowa Power Co-op.
v. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 561 F.3d 904, 914 (8th Cir.
2009) (remanding and contrasting the “private contract—a bread-and-butter
state court issue” with Grable’s “slim category”); Morgan Cnty. War Mem’l Hosp.
ex rel. Bd. of Dirs. of War Mem’l Hosp. v. Baker, 314 F. App’x 529, 536 (4th Cir.
2008) (denying jurisdiction because “Appellees cannot be squeezed into Grable’s
slim category”); Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290,
1296 (11th Cir. 2008) (remanding when “keeping in mind that the Supreme Court
has explained that ‘Grable exemplifies’ a ‘slim category’ of cases”); Mikulski v.
Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555, 574 (6th Cir. 2007) (remanding because
“this case ‘cannot be squeezed into the slim category’ ”); Bennett v. Sw. Airlines
Co., 484 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2007) (remanding after comparing case to Empire
and quoting “slim category” passage); cf. Potter v. Hughes, 546 F.3d 1051,
1065 (9th Cir. 2008) (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (arguing that, instead of affirming
district court’s dismissal of the complaint, the appellate court should have remanded for lack of jurisdiction, citing Empire’s “slim” passage).
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Cinching Jurisdiction with Pragmatism, Presumptions,
and Procedure

In addition to the forces of implementing opinions’ interpretations,
a study of decisions using Grable’s rule requires acknowledgement of
the pragmatic pressures of judicial administration. For embedded federal-question jurisdiction, docket-management concerns and the preexisting responses to those concerns exert pressure against exercising
jurisdiction.
Grable’s federalism veto and Empire’s slimming prescription took
aim at averting a flood of federal-question cases, providing a doctrinal
avenue for courts to control their caseloads with remand. Invocations
of “common sense,” which have permeated the development of the test,
have further tightened the spigot on federal-question jurisdiction.167
Although doctrinally “the right to remove has never been dependent
on the state of the federal court’s docket,”168 the practical reality—or
the perceived reality—that Congress intended the federal courts to
have a lighter workload frequently has led courts to decline to exercise
jurisdiction.169 This docket-management pragmatism has manifested
itself in many forms.
Structural incentives to remand cases removed from state courts
help calm the fear of torrential federal litigation. Most notably,
§ 1447(d) forecloses appellate review of remand orders, but not orders
167. E.g., Grable, 545 U.S. at 312 (“The doctrine captures the commonsense [sic] notion that a federal court ought to be able to hear claims recognized under state
law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law . . . .”);
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 20 (1983) (“We
have always interpreted . . . ‘the current of jurisdictional legislation since the Act
of March 3, 1875,’ with an eye to practicality and necessity.” (quoting Skelly Oil
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673 (1950))); Romero v. Int’l Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 378–80 (1959) (applying “commonsensical [sic] and
lawyer-like modes of construction, and the evidence of history and logic” to federal-question jurisdiction); Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1936)
(explaining that embedded federal-question jurisdiction requires a “commonsense accommodation of judgment to [the] kaleidoscopic situations” in which federal issues arise). Compare Grable, 545 U.S. at 315 (upholding jurisdiction because tax law “is an important issue . . . that sensibly belongs in a federal court”),
with Empire, 547 U.S. at 700–01 (denying jurisdiction because “the bottom-line
practical issue” was too fact-specific). But see Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling &
Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 186 (1907) (“[T]he Federal courts should not sanction
devices intended to prevent a removal to a Federal court where one has that
right, and should be equally vigilant to protect the right to proceed in the Federal
court as to permit the state courts, in proper cases, to retain their own jurisdiction.”); Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004) (discussing fraudulent joinder); 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3641 (3d ed. 1998) (same).
168. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344 (1976).
169. See generally Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV. 717, 764–65 (1986) (discussing docket pressure in the
creation of the three-tiered federal court system).
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denying remand.170 While the 1875 Act allowed review of remand orders by writ of error or appeal in the Supreme Court, the 1887 amendments to the Act repealed the appellate review provision and
substituted “a provision that ‘improperly removed’ cases should be remanded and that ‘no appeal or writ of error from the decision of the
circuit court so remanding such cause shall be allowed.’ ”171
In precluding appellate review, Congress sought to relieve the
courts of appeals’ burgeoning docket and prevent “interruption of the
litigation of the merits of a removed cause by prolonged litigation of
questions of jurisdiction of the district court.”172 Section 1447(d)
therefore provides: “An order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.”173
The statutory foreclosure of appeals has sparked the widely-muttered
suspicion among litigants that district courts use subject-matter jurisdiction remand to manage their caseloads, regardless of the merits.174
Some commentators have called for a change in the prohibition.175 In
terms of clarity’s goals, this particular pairing of clear rules (appeal of
remand foreclosed) and fuzzy rules (discretion in the basis for remanding) carries the potential to erode both predictability and legitimacy.
In addition to Congress’s foreclosure of appeal, the judicially-created presumption against jurisdiction in removed cases helps curb the
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006); see also Woods v. Nissan N. Am., No. Civ. CCB-042898, 2005 WL 1000089, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 29, 2005) (“[A] district court should be
cautious in denying defendants access to a federal forum because remand orders
are generally unreviewable”). Similarly, the procedure for removal set forth in
§ 1446(a) sets a thirty-day window in which the defendant must remove. 28
U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2006). If the defendant misses this window, or cannot secure
the consent of other defendants within time, the court cannot exercise federalquestion jurisdiction.
171. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 346–47 (quoting The Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24
Stat. 553); see Rhonda Wasserman, Rethinking Review of Remands: Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Removal Statute, 43 EMORY L. J. 83, 113–19 (1994).
172. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 640 (2006) (quoting United States
v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751 (1946)).
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006). Notably, courts have held that § 1447(d) also prohibits granting review of remand orders under § 1292(b). E.g., In re WTC Disaster
Site, 414 F.3d 352, 367 (2d Cir. 2005); Feidt v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
153 F.3d 124, 129–30 (3d Cir. 1998); Krangel v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d
914, 914 (9th Cir. 1992).
174. E.g., Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 339 (reversing district court’s remand based on
docket control); see also Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 1147, 1189 (2006) (illustrating ways in which appellate courts have attempted to “repress docket clearing behavior” including jurisdictional dismissals
and remands).
175. See, e.g., Bradt, supra note 78; James E. Pfander, Collateral Review of Remand
Orders: Reasserting the Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 493 (2011); Wasserman, supra note 171 (arguing for a return to appellate
review of certain remand orders); see also infra section IV.C.
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number of cases proceeding in the federal courts.176 The Supreme
Court endorsed strict construction of the remand statute, relying on
the Congressional purpose in the 1887 Amendments.177 The Fourth
Circuit and other circuit courts have cited “significant federalism concerns” justifying the strict construction and the presumption against
jurisdiction.178 This presumption further tips the scale toward remand in doubtful and debatable cases.179 Practically speaking, the
176. The fee-shifting provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) further adds to the pressure
against removal jurisdiction. This subsection permits district courts to order defendants to pay plaintiffs’ costs in defending “baseless” removals. Notably, 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c) “is not a sanctions rule; it is a fee-shifting statute, entitling the
district court to make whole the victorious party.” Garbie v. Daimler Chrysler
Corp., 211 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, removals carry the possibility of
fee-shifting, even if they otherwise satisfy Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and are in good faith.
177. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941) (“[T]he
language of the Act of 1887 evidence the Congressional purpose to restrict the
jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal, but the policy of the successive acts
of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the
strict construction of such legislation.”).
178. E.g., Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 555 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The Supreme Court’s command that federal courts must exercise jurisdictional restraint
is perhaps even more compelling in the context of removal than in the context of
original jurisdiction. The decision whether to remove a suit to federal court directly implicates the constitutional allocation of authority between the federal
and state courts.”); Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362,
365–66 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[B]ecause the effect of removal is to deprive the state
court of an action properly before it, removal raises significant federalism concerns” and requires strict construction); Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems.
Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Because removal jurisdiction raises
significant federalism concerns, we must strictly construe removal jurisdiction.”);
see also Adams v. Aero Servs. Int’l, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D. Va.1987)
(“Removal of civil cases to federal court is an infringement on state sovereignty.”);
Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 109 (“Due regard for the rightful independence of state
governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has
defined.”).
179. See, e.g., In re Hot-Hed Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[A]ny doubt about
the propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand . . . .”); Lorenz v.
Tex. Workforce Comm’n, 211 F. App’x 242, 245 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[A]mbiguities are
construed against removal because the removal statute is strictly construed in
favor of remand.”); In re Baby C v. Price, 138 F. App’x 81, 83 (10th Cir. 2005)
(noting the presumption against removal jurisdiction and that “doubtful cases
must be resolved in favor of remand”); Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151 (“If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary.”); Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d
908, 911 (7th Cir.1993) (doubts about removal are resolved in favor of remand);
In re Bus. Men’s Assurance Co. of Am., 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993);
Cheshire v. Coca-Cola Bottling Affiliated, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (D.S.C.
1990); cf. Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 425–26 (4th Cir. 1999)
(holding that, in fraudulent joinder analysis on removal, “there need be only a
slight possibility of a right to relief. Once the court identifies this glimmer of
hope for the plaintiff, the jurisdictional inquiry ends.”); Hartman v. Caraco
Pharm. Labs., Ltd., Civ. No. 2:10–1319, 2011 WL 1636961, at *2 (S.D. W. Va.
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strict construction toward remand in these close cases, coupled with
§ 1447(d)’s foreclosure of appeal for remands, must divert many debatable cases away from the possible clarifying influence of appellate review. This when-in-doubt-throw-it-out presumption practically
controverts the professed desire for clarity in jurisdictional rules by
preventing appellate clarification of many doubtful or unclear applications of the rule.
The federal-question jurisdiction landscape thus includes some
clear rules, some fuzzy ones, a recent clarification, and procedural obstacles that may stunt further clarification. It is fertile ground to
study the effect of these jurisdictional rules through the eyes of its
beholders: district courts and the litigants drawn there.
III. VIEWING CLARIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
THROUGH GRABLE
Jurisdictional clarity’s goals focus on how the rule is received and
perceived. For embedded federal-question jurisdiction, Grable offers a
clarifying event and a choice of a nuanced rule through which to examine how clarity works—how a rule may be received and perceived
by litigants and the courts they seek to predict.
This Part looks at Grable’s impact on district and appellate decision-making by studying the precedents created before and after the
decision. The empirical study presented here captured a sample of the
precedent available on Westlaw, as well as the “submerged” precedents found only on the courts’ electronic dockets. The results give a
snapshot of the federal-question jurisdiction precedent being generated by the courts and the picture of the clarification process as litigants may see it.
A.

Sample of Decisions

To examine the picture of embedded federal-question precedent
available for litigants making jurisdictional predictions, the study
sought to gather information on (1) whether district court remand
Apr. 29, 2011) (“[F]raudulent joinder claims are subject to a rather black-andwhite analysis in this circuit. Any shades of gray are resolved in favor of remand.
At bottom, a plaintiff need only demonstrate a ‘glimmer of hope’ in order to have
his claims remanded.”). See generally Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias
Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 609, 637 (2004). But see McKinney v. Bd.
of Trs. of Md. Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924, 927–28 (4th Cir. 1992) (warning against
“assuming that there is something inherently bad about removal and ‘defeating’
the plaintiff’s choice of forum”; explaining that, “[t]o the contrary, by providing
for removal in the first place, Congress seems to believe that the defendant’s
right to remove a case that could be heard in federal court is at least as important
as the plaintiff’s right to the forum of his choice”); id. at 927 (“Rather than favoring plaintiffs or defendants, . . . the removal procedure is intended to be ‘fair to
both plaintiffs and defendants alike.’ ”).
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rates changed after Grable stated its unified, flexible test; (2) whether
there are any observable differences in available precedent—decisions
available on Westlaw or only on dockets; and (3) whether litigants and
courts have more accurately predicted and advocated for removal jurisdiction under the new rule. To pursue answers, I examined district
and appellate court decisions adjudicating federal-question jurisdiction for federal questions embedded in state-law claims before and after Grable. For district court decisions on embedded federal
questions, this study draws from decisions available on Westlaw, as
well as those available only through the courts’ electronic dockets.180
While expanding the base of available decisions, this descriptive
study narrowly focuses on those three questions. It does not, for example, test which rules are linguistically more clear or what opinions
are more clear.181 Nor does it compare diversity or appellate jurisdiction, which ostensibly are more straightforward, to federal-question
jurisdiction. And it does not make comparisons of clarity among the
various bases for removal (e.g., federal officer, foreign state, etc.).
This study begins to address, but does not directly answer, specific
calls for empirical studies to measure the systemic costs of clarity and
ambiguity.182 Nor does it meet challenges to test different designs for
jurisdictional rules.183 This study begins with a much more modest
180. Inclusion of district court docket research finds increasing support among empiricists and others studying decision-making. See, e.g., Hoffman, et al., supra note
52. Among the five most cited studies including docket research are (1) Evan J.
Ringquist & Craig E. Emmert, Judicial Policymaking in Published and Unpublished Decisions: The Case of Environmental Civil Litigation, 52 POL. RES. Q. 7
(1999); (2) Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its
Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination
Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133 (1990); (3) Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal
District Courts Through Published Cases: A Research Note, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 782,
784 (1992); (4) Donald R. Songer, Nonpublication in the United States District
Courts: Official Criteria Versus Inferences from Appellate Review, 50 J. POL. 206
(1988); and (5) the methodical and methodological study in Hoffman et al., supra
note 52. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim et al., How Should We Study District Judge
Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 83 (2009); Levin, supra note 45,
988–89.
181. Cf. Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1998); Ryan J. Owens & Justin P.
Wedeking, Justices and Legal Clarity: Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Supreme
Court Opinions, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1027 (2011).
182. Scott Dodson, for example, argues that, “difficulties in design, implementation,
and instrumentalism all erode the ideal of clear and simple jurisdictional rules.”
Dodson, supra note 14, at 49–50. In doing so, he acknowledges the need for empirical studies to test whether clarity decreases judicial and litigant costs and
smoothes intergovernmental relations. Id. at 50 n.236.
183. In his response to Dodson’s call for embracing complexity, Lumen Mulligan concedes the worthiness of Dodson’s addition to the debate, saying “clarity comes at
a cost,” but laments that difficulties in empirically testing the costs of different
jurisdictional regimes may freeze the debate at a purely theoretical level. Lumen

R

R
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step, focusing instead on a portion of the implementation process for
already-designed and ostensibly improved rules. Indeed, the study is
merely descriptive of what is happening in a certain corner of Grable’s
implementation and what it looks like from different perspectives,
without the power to satisfyingly test why it is happening or what if a
different jurisdictional regime heard a similar mix of arguments.
Nonetheless, understanding some of the what hopefully will give a
nudge to this important debate.
The database developed for this study included decisions from
2002–2008 identified as adjudicating removal jurisdiction over embedded federal questions. The database was limited to cases from the
Fourth and Seventh Circuit available on Westlaw and PACER, cases
from all district courts in those circuits available on Westlaw, and
cases from the Northern District of Illinois and the Eastern District of
Virginia available only on PACER. This limited set results from the
following principles.
1.

Sample and Sources of Decisions

First, this study looks solely at decisions in the “tangled corner” of
embedded federal-questions and encompasses only § 1441 federalquestion removals. It does not include all of § 1331 arising-under jurisdiction or all originally filed federal-question cases.184 Nor does it
include removals on all jurisdictional bases.185 By focusing on the
Grable-type removals, the study aims to capture those decisions in
which Grable and Merrell Dow could and should be applied by district
courts. Further, the focus on removed cases was intended to include
those cases in which jurisdiction would most likely be contested, flowing from plaintiff’s choice of state claims and state court, and defendant’s preference for federal court, expressed in removing the case.
And the restriction to removals served a practical purpose. Because
the author included PACER cases in her data collection, it was necessary to confine the search to removed cases (identified in PACER as
filed under 28 U.S.C §§ 1441 and based on “federal question” jurisdiction), rather than sift through all cases filed originally in federal court
N. Mulligan, Clear Rules—Not Necessarily Simple or Accessible Ones, 97 VA. L.
REV. 13, 21–22 (2011).
184. A future study could add to the dataset and compare federal-question original
filings with removals. Nonetheless, confining the study to removals likely excluded few cases. See Ryan, supra note 47, at 678 & n.133 (excluding originallyfiled cases from study of delay in embedded federal question cases and noting a
ratio of 59:6 removed cases to originally filed cases in a sample of commerciallyavailable opinions).
185. It excludes, for example, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 removals based on diversity jurisdiction, as well as § 1441(d) foreign state, § 1441(e) mass action, § 1442 federal officer defendant removals, § 1443 civil rights, and § 1444 foreclosure of federal
property removals.

R
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asserting federal question jurisdiction to find the few asserting embedded federal question jurisdiction, rather than a federal claim.186
To capture the relevant decisions, the author searched both
Westlaw and federal courts’ electronic dockets via PACER. The
database included published and unpublished decisions from
Westlaw, as well as those decisions available only on PACER.
The decision to include both published and unpublished decisions
was an easy one, made on the empirical foundations laid in previous
studies. As several commentators have argued, the full picture of district court decision-making should include not only all decisions available on the commercial databases, but also those decisions recorded
solely on the courts’ dockets.187 This is because, as Stephen Burbank
has admonished, “[T]he law in the books is not a reliable guide to the
law in action.”188 Biases in the selection of decisions for inclusion in
the federal reporters, in the availability of unpublished opinions, and
even in the amount of explanation for a given outcome, all distort the
picture of the legal landscape taken through the lens of published
opinions.189 Focusing on published opinions is thus doubly under-inclusive of district court decision-making. First, focus on published
opinions includes only those few opinions the authoring judges themselves deem worthy of inclusion in a reporter.190 This choice has in186. PACER currently does not contain a mechanism for parties to select embedded
federal-question jurisdiction as the filing basis. The only four options for identifying “[t]he basis of jurisdiction under which this complaint has been filed” at the
district court level are, “(1) U.S. Government Plaintiff; (2) U.S. Government Defendant; (3) Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party); [or] (4) Diversity.”
PACER User Manual for ECF Courts, PACER 53 (last updated June 2010) [hereinafter PACER manual], http://www.pacer.gov/documents/pacermanual.pdf.
187. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 591, 604 (2004); Hoffman et al., supra note 52, at 727 (“In our view, docketology’s main contribution is to starkly expose how little trial court work is explained through written opinions. An astonishingly low 3% of all orders are
available on the databases; more than 80% of difficult orders are similarly “hidden” without explanation.”); see also, e.g., Kim et al., supra note 180, at 86 (outlining how researchers should take “advantage of the electronic docketing system
now operating in all federal district courts”); Levin, supra note 45, at 997
(describing the quest by “judges, lawyers and scholars [to] include in their research as many unpublished opinions as they can possibly get their hands on” to
help “determine exactly what judges are doing in actual cases and hold them
accountable”).
188. Burbank, supra note 187, at 604.
189. Id. Problems include risk of producing biased results because many opinions are
unpublished, many district court decisions do not produce opinions, and not all
cases filed receive adjudication (many are concluded by settlement or agreement).
Kim et al., supra note 180, at 97.
190. Across all doctrines, published opinions make up a small portion of all opinions,
under representative of decision-making in general. Kim et al, supra note 180, at
97 n.43 (citing United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-1997
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herent bias because it is not a random selection for publication; it is
the author’s choice and based on myriad subjective and idiosyncratic
factors.191 Studies have identified systematic differences between
published and unpublished opinions.192
Second, focus on opinions necessarily excludes decisions memorialized in mere “orders”—a potentially large proportion of district court
decisions.193 The Docketology study, most notably, found opinions
written in only three percent of all judicial actions and less than
twenty percent of all non-ministerial orders.194 Commentators have
suggested that opinions are more likely to accompany appealable determinations, such as granting motions to dismiss or for summary
judgment.195 Decisions whether to remand alleged embedded federal
questions carry this potential bias due to § 1447’s prohibition on appeals for jurisdictional remands.196
The decision to include PACER dockets seemed equally obvious for
the purposes of my study. I wanted to take an accurate picture of how
courts implemented Grable’s rule, so looking only at those cases that
resulted in decisions published in Westlaw would necessarily exclude
decisions the database editors did not know about, or did not select for
inclusion.

191.

192.

193.
194.
195.
196.

Terms, ICPSR (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/stud
ies/09422 (finding based on Federal Judicial Center data that, of the 41% of cases
briefed and submitted, only one-quarter produce published opinions)).
The Judicial Conference in 1964 stated the criterion for publication decisions of
federal judges, “The judges of the courts of appeals and the district courts authorize the publication of only those opinions which are of general precedential
value.” ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1964), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/judconf/64-Mar.pdf; see Songer, supra note 180, at 206. Cases with
“general precedential value” excludes the many cases that require only the “clear
extention [sic]of a prior rule of law” which are “assumed to have little or no precedential value, contribute little to the development of public policy, and to involve
no significant exercise of discretion by federal judges.” Songer, supra note 180, at
207 (citing Pamela Foa, Comment, A Snake in the Path of the Law: The Seventh
Circuit’s Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 309, 309–40 (1977)).
Rowland and Carp’s study found greater ideological influence and liberal bent in
published district court opinions than unpublished ones. See C.K. Rowland &
Robert A. Carp, POLITICS & JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (24–25)
(1996). Donald Songer’s study found that more than half of the difficult appellate
decisions (reversals and non-unanimous decisions) originated with unpublished
district court opinions. Songer, supra note 180, at 211–13; see Kim et al., supra
note 180, at 98 (reviewing these studies and concluding that “published district
court opinions can neither be taken as representative of all district court opinions
nor assumed to capture all of the important policy-making decisions”).
Kim et al., supra note 180, at 98–99.
Hoffman et al., supra note 52, at 682.
See id. at 719, 721 n.161 (“[D]ispositions within cases that resulted in an appeal
were more likely to result in opinions.”); Kim et al., supra note 180, at 99 (repeating this speculation).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006).
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In addition to the opinions published at judges’ requests, the federal courts must post all written opinions on their websites regardless
of publication status.197 Opinions, per the Judicial Conference, constitutes only those decisions “that set[ ] forth a reasoned explanation for
a court’s decision.”198 Westlaw identifies and selects these unpublished opinions for inclusion in its federal case law database by the
criteria that they are “opinions of interest to the local bench and bar in
a particular district.”199 That leaves a number of decisions out of the
database and therefore only available via PACER. Remand decisions
seemed especially susceptible to under-inclusion in Westlaw because
the decision to remand is unappealable, and therefore would not result in any published appellate opinion.200 And, I speculated, remand
decisions might be less likely to generate enough explanation at the
district court level to attract Westlaw’s attention. Thus, I included
Westlaw and PACER decisions to test the hypothesis of Westlaw’s
under-inclusion, and to get the full picture of how the federal courts
are implementing Grable.
While Westlaw contains mostly reasoned opinions, PACER includes even those district court decisions without fully reasoned opinions. Espousing “docketology: the intensive study of trial court
dockets,” Hoffman, Izeman, and Lidicker found that a large portion of
district courts’ work does not come with an explanation, and this mass
of “under-explained work . . . makes up the constitutive backbone of
litigants’ substantive rights” adjudicated by courts.201 As Kim,
Schlanger, Boyd, and Martin have suggested, “PACER offers a significant data source for more accurately capturing and understanding the
activity of the district courts” because it captures all events in a case’s
life and makes most written documents available electronically for a
small fee.202 Further, the Docketology study found that studying
PACER in addition to Westlaw “permits a comparison of decisions
which are truly comparable—i.e., those made in the same procedural
context—rather than simply comparing whatever decisions are available” through Westlaw and Lexis.203
197. Hoffman et al., supra note 52, at 692–93 (citing LINDA D. KOONTZ, U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE
MADE PROGRESS IMPLEMENTING THE E-GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2002 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-12).
198. Id. at 693.
199. Levin, supra note 45, at 986 (quoting WEST PUBLISHING CO., PUBLICATION GUIDE
FOR JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 2 (1994)).
200. With a few notable exceptions, described in the subsection on reversal rates. See
infra subsection III.D.2.
201. Hoffman et al., supra note 52, at 684–85.
202. Kim et al., supra note 180, at 103.
203. Id. at 106.
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As between Westlaw and Lexis for database cases, many of the
available accounts point to relative parity between the two databases’
case law collections.204 But the Docketology study of four busy district
courts found that Westlaw captured more opinions than Lexis.205
Based on this slight superiority and my own anecdotal testing, I included only the more inclusive of two databases in the study:
Westlaw.206
Within the Westlaw database, my search included all cases mentioning removal, remand, and federal-question jurisdiction, regardless
of whether they had been designated for publication in a reporter series.207 This search produced an over-inclusive list of cases.208 From
the results, only those cases actually deciding jurisdiction over embedded federal questions were included in the dataset.209
204. See generally KENDALL F. SVENGALIS, LEGAL INFORMATION BUYER’S GUIDE & REFERENCE MANUAL 147–52 (2005) (explaining that, although, Westlaw initially enjoyed a major advantage in case indexing, the competitive process of
“leapfrogging” has produced relative parity between the two databases), available
at http://access-to-law.com/elaw/readings/sven3_full.rtf; see also Julie Jones,
Lexis Joins Westlaw in Providing Access to Court Dockets, U. CONN. L. SCH. (Dec.
18, 2009, 5:18 PM), available at http://www.law.uconn.edu/content/lexis-joinswestlaw-providing-access-court-dockets (implying that Westlaw provided docket
access before Lexis).
205. Hoffman et al., supra note 52, at 710 n.138 (noting that, in New York and Pennsylvania, the databases were essentially identical, but that for California and
Maryland district courts, Lexis’s collection was significantly smaller). This is due
in part to the way the database duopoly began: Westlaw published reporters initially. When Lexis emerged, it got started by hiring typists to copy Westlaw’s
cases into its own new database. See id.
206. A majority of law librarians share my preference. See J. Paul Lomio & Erika V.
Wayne, Law Librarians and LexisNexis vs. Westlaw: Survey Results, STAN. L.
SCH. LEGAL RES. PAPER SERIES, Paper No. 23, 21, Figure 20 (July 2008), http://
www.law.stanford.edu/publications/projects/lrps/pdf/lomiowayne-rp23.pdf (finding that a substantial majority of law librarians working in various institutional
settings prefer Westlaw to Lexis, but surveying participants’ preferences without
testing those assumptions against the databases’ actual content).
207. See Appendix 2. The search terms in Westlaw were: REMOV! “ARISE UNDER”
& REMAND! & “1441” “REMOVAL JURISDICTION” & (“FEDERAL QUESTION” “FEDERAL QUESTIONS”). The author performed the searches and distributed the resulting lists to her coders.
208. Two hundred fifty of the total 533 hits did not actually adjudicate jurisdiction
over an embedded federal question. Thus, the Westlaw dataset is comprised of
approximately 53% of the total hits. Cf. Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 180,
at 1140 (describing “deliberately broad” search terms used to capture all decisions in a particular substantive area of law, employment discrimination).
209. The database excluded, for example, decisions made exclusively on the issue of
complete preemption that did not adjudicate whether a federal question was embedded in the state-law claims. I excluded these cases because complete preemption doctrine transforms the state-law claims into federal claims, rather than
picking essential federal issues from state-law claims and leaving the plaintiff’s
chosen claims intact. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)
(noting that complete preemption exists where the preemptive force of a federal
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In PACER, the search included those civil cases designated as filed
under § 1441 as “cause of action”210 and “federal question” as “jurisdiction”.211 Because the PACER searches necessarily were based on
the as-filed characteristics of the cases instead of specified terms in an
opinion like Westlaw, the PACER reports included a relatively small
proportion of actual decisions on federal-question jurisdiction.212
2.

Sample of Jurisdictions

Because this study sought a snapshot of the implementation process, rather than a comprehensive catalog of opinions, the author
started with a sample of federal-question decisions based on jurisdiction. To capture both sides of the circuit split resolved in Grable, the
author chose courts on each side of the split. The study focuses on the
Fourth and Seventh Circuits because the Fourth and Seventh had the
longest-running jurisprudence on each side of the Merrell Dow
split.213 Those two circuits also happen to have busy courts, offering a
large pool of decisions to investigate.
Within PACER, the author began with a more limited sample from
the district courts due to the intense labor necessary to search dockets. Specifically, the author started the PACER coding with the busiest district court in each circuit according to the U.S. Courts

210.

211.

212.

213.

statute is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state law claim into a
statutory federal claim). But, if a decision considered removal based (both or alternatively) on an embedded federal question and on complete preemption, I
coded the embedded federal question portion and included it in the database.
See PACER manual, supra note 186, at 59 (describing “CAUSE” field as identifying “[t]he U.S. Civil Statute (in Title: Section format) under which the plaintiff
filed the complaint and a brief description of the statute”).
This was accomplished by creating reports in the PACER Civil Cases Reports
feature of actions filed under the removal statute, 28 U.S.C 1441, denoting “federal question” as the jurisdiction.
A great portion of the cases filed as § 1441 federal-question jurisdiction either
settled, were dismissed, had no dispute over jurisdiction, or otherwise had no
decision on federal-question jurisdiction. It is possible that, in a subset of these
no-decision cases, the judge was satisfied that the case warranted federal-question jurisdiction but did not take the opportunity to record that conclusion in a
sua sponte decision. This would represent a decision of sorts upholding jurisdiction, but one of which there is no evidence other than silence. This hypothetical
category of silent decisions is not considered in this study because it remains, for
the moment, too hypothetical. Cf. Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 180, at 1139
(noting in the employment discrimination context that “[c]ases that required judicial action are likely to be subject to the same kinds of sample selection as published cases”).
See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312
n.2 (2005) (comparing Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding
that federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim requires a parallel federal private right of action), with Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799, 806
(4th Cir. 1996) (finding that a federal private action is not required)).
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Administrative Office statistics.214 By investigating the dockets in
each circuit’s busiest district, the author hoped to get a snapshot of
how the PACER decisions align with those available on Westlaw.
Because this study looks at Grable’s clarification of Merrell Dow,
the author sampled the subset of decisions in these jurisdictions for
the three and a half years before and after the Grable opinion issued.
The coding begins January 1, 2002, and ends December 31, 2008, with
Grable intervening almost exactly midway on June 13, 2005.
The database thus included published and unpublished Westlaw
cases from all courts in the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, as well as
cases from the two district courts (Northern District of Illinois and
Eastern District of Virginia) available only on PACER, adjudicating
jurisdiction over embedded federal questions between January 1, 2002
and December 31, 2008. The decisions included in the database were
coded for, among other things, their source (Westlaw or PACER), their
disposition on the embedded federal-question jurisdictional issue, and
their level of depth (whether a simple order or a reasoned
explanation).215
After culling the irrelevant Westlaw decisions from the search results and sifting through thousands of dockets to identify the additional remand decisions, 416 decisions remained in the data sample
for analysis. This is a modest sample, warranting caution in drawing
any conclusions, and is most useful for describing the landscape of decision-making, before and after Grable. If nothing else, the small sample size suggests that Grable’s jurisdiction is, in fact, as Justice
Ginsburg prescribed in Empire, a “slim category.”
The remainder of this Part describes the results from the sample
data.
B.

Submerged Precedent

The author examined the picture of embedded federal-question
precedents litigants would see through conventional research methods—using a commercial database—and compared that view with the
whole picture of decision-making available through docket research.
214. See Appendix 1: Selection Criteria for Sample District Courts.
215. See Appendix 2: Remand Rate Coding Information and Variables for a more detailed description of the codebook information and process. Within the docket
research, I did, however, only collect announced rulings on jurisdiction. Because
federal judges have an obligation to determine jurisdiction even if not raised by
the parties, some cases without an announced ruling ostensibly could represent a
silent “decision” that jurisdiction existed. But, I did not try to code these rulingless jurisdictional decisions because they are too hypothetical. That level of coding would delve into decisions announced only in judges’ minds. The author has
neither the technology nor the inclination to study that currently.
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One trend the study unearthed in the two sampled districts is that
a relatively small number of embedded federal-question jurisdiction
decisions made it into the Westlaw database: about 42% of the decisions in the whole sample were available on Westlaw and the remaining 58% were available only on PACER.216 The decisions exclusively
on PACER the author refers to as “submerged precedent” in a nod to
the iceberg metaphor used to describe the portion of cases that get
reported to the general public.217 Referring to docket decisions as
submerged precedent also avoids confusion over the changing definition of “published” versus “unpublished” decisions.218
This mass of submerged precedent suggests research based solely
on cases in the commercial databases carries a risk of distorting the
picture of district court decision-making. For embedded federal-question decisions, Westlaw research alone would exclude more than half
of the decisions generated. While the observation of under-inclusiveness in Westlaw (and Lexis) is not a new one, my study data corroborates findings in previous studies, which have added
incrementally to the scholarship on civil docket research and its implications for empirical claims by assessing differences in availability,
publication, and decision writing.219 Where previous studies have
sampled publication and/or docket decisions in particular areas of substantive law,220 or the habits of particular jurisdictions,221 this study
216. For the Northern District of Illinois, for example, the search captured thirty-four
decisions in Westlaw from January 1, 2004, through January 1, 2008, and eightyone decisions in PACER for the same period.
217. See, e.g., Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 180 (describing published opinions as
the iceberg’s tip and unpublished opinions as the iceberg’s remainder); see also
Hoffman et al., supra note 52, at 687 (acknowledging the same idea).
218. Compare Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 180, at 1138 (defining “published” as
available on Lexis), and Levin, supra note 45, at 985 (same), with Siegelman &
Donohue, supra note 180, at 1138 (explaining that previous circuit court rules
defined “published” as having full text of the opinion “appearing in print in a
West reporter”) and William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent: Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1169–71, 1194 (1978) (contemplating “published” opinions as those available in print and examining printing
costs).
219. See generally Hoffman, et al., supra note 52, at 687–90 (surveying studies).
220. See, e.g., Ringquist & Emmert, supra note 180 (comparing policymaking aspects
of published and unpublished decisions in environmental civil litigation,
1974–91); Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 180 (employment discrimination
cases generating Lexis opinions versus those filed, 1972–86); Songer, supra note
181 (comparing reversal rates of published and unpublished district court decisions in a sample of criminal, antitrust, and labor cases from 1976–84).
221. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 180 (comparing District of Minnesota cases available
on microfiche versus databases, 1982–84); Reynolds & Richman, supra note 218
(comparing published and unpublished circuit court decisions).
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focuses on a particular procedural juncture and begins to cut across
jurisdictions.222
Siegelman and Donohue, for example, studied employment discrimination cases in the Northern District of Illinois between 1972
and 1987, comparing the number of decisions available on Lexis to the
number of cases filed.223 Out of the 4,310 cases filed in the sample, an
average of 71% generated an opinion of some kind picked up by
Lexis.224 Siegelman and Donohue concluded that this 29% of cases
not appearing in Lexis could make Lexis decisions an unrepresentative sample.225 While my sample of embedded federal-question removals was much smaller, the higher rate of decisions not appearing
in Westlaw (58%) suggests a similar, or perhaps greater, potential for
sample bias in commercial database cases. Further, the expansion of
the employment study across seven other districts showed the rate of
submergence varied by region, making database cases a geographically skewed sample, as well.226 In Siegelman and Donohue’s study,
the Northern District of Illinois had a comparatively high publication
rate for civil cases,227 suggesting that the rate of submergence in
other districts may likely be even greater than the rates observed
here. The 58% submergence rate observed in this study thus adds another increment to the empirical literature, and adds yet another note
of caution on the risks of trying to study the iceberg from its tip.
Beyond the academic implications for empirical studies of jurisdictional decision-making, the submergence of embedded federal-question precedents has special relevance to the primary goal of the
jurisdictional clarity mantra—litigant predictability—because litigants use precedent to make predictions and arguments about how
and what a court will decide in their case. By researching precedent
only in the commercial databases, litigants could see less than half of
the embedded federal-question decisions made by the relevant court.
The practical availability of precedent opinions therefore impacts the
amount and representativeness of the data visible to litigants—it affects how clearly they can see the true picture of jurisdictional rules’
application.
Because the available precedent necessarily impacts litigants’ predictive powers for determining jurisdiction, the amount of explanation
and number of readily-available opinions should affect the implemen222. Cf. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 218 (comparing published and unpublished
circuit court decisions).
223. Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 180, at 1139.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1144.
226. Id. Of the seven districts studied by Siegelman & Donohue, the Northern District
of Illinois had the second highest publication rate across all civil cases. See id. at
1143 tbl.1. .
227. Id.
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tation process. This submerged precedent has two main implications
for jurisdictional clarity and clarification. First, it raises the questions
of what is submerged, why it is submerged, and how it could emerge.
Second, it changes the picture of implementation and application, and
therefore opportunities for clarification. That is, looking beneath the
surface changes the picture of how district courts are applying the
rule.
All decisions begin below the surface because they are issued to
parties in a dispute and therefore must be entered on the litigation’s
electronic docket. District judges, unlike appellate ones, are not required to send Westlaw and Lexis their opinions.228 So district
judges’ discretion buoys particular decisions to the surface. District
judges can designate decisions for publication in a reporter, they can
send them to Westlaw, and they can, to some extent, suggest what
decisions should comprise the visible precedent.229 And the Westlaw
editorial team makes further selections from the available cases.230
In addition, the commercial databases collect decisions periodically
from PACER, including in the database those decisions of “substance”
and discarding “procedural orders.”231
Ostensibly, the cases that make it to the surface have more than a
conclusion; they offer some reasoned explanation and precedential
value. But, adding to the inherent risk of an unrepresentative picture,
the submerged embedded federal-question precedent identified here
suggests that not only the number of remands is obscured, but also
that some valuable, reasoned precedents are out of view. In the
Northern District of Illinois sample in this study, 23.75% of the submerged decisions had reasoned explanations, as opposed to bare
orders.232
228. See Levin, supra note 45, at 985.
229. See, e.g., id., at 986–88.
230. See generally Olson, supra note 180, at 784–87 (describing the database collection
and editorial process as of 1992).
231. See Correspondence from Kirc J. Breissinger, Dir. of Prod. Planning, LexisNexis,
to Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Faculty Fellow, Thomas Jefferson Sch. of Law (Aug.
31, 2011) (on file with author) (explaining that Lexis collects from PACER all
decisions that are “substantive in nature,” which “generally means that [Lexis]
avoid[s] procedural orders”).
232. In the Northern District of Illinois PACER sample collected here, nineteen of the
eighty decisions warranted coding as “opinion” instead of “order” based on the
coding criteria described in Appendix 2. Data and codebook on file with author.
As described in Part III, below, a simple administrative solution may exist to
bring the reasoned opinions into Westlaw’s purview. Because Westlaw appears
to collect its decisions from those tagged as “Written Opinion” in PACER, requiring explained jurisdictional decisions to carry this PACER coding could bring
more of these precedents into view through the commercial databases. Data on
file with author.
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The proportion of submerged cases to database cases varied
slightly over time. As illustrated below in Figure 1, the proportion of
decisions available in Westlaw increased slightly in the Northern District of Illinois the year before Grable and the year after. The proportion then decreased during the year following Empire, as more
decisions were submerged. But, in the second year after Empire, the
proportion in Westlaw dramatically increased, by around 18%. The
more dramatic increase in Westlaw availability corresponds roughly
with the April 24, 2007 issuance of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in
Bennett v. Southwest Airlines233—the first Seventh Circuit opinion
applying Grable. This raises the possibility that the district court became more comfortable offering opinions for public consumption after
receiving guidance from its appellate court.
Figure 1

This overall rise in the number of cases captured in Westlaw bears
some similarity to Siegelman and Donohue’s observations that the
percentage of employment discrimination cases filed with a decision
included in Lexis rose over time.234 Although the reason for the
strong upward trend in their data remained unclear, the authors speculated that it could reflect increased collection efforts by the
databases.235 They posed, however, that the trend more likely reflected new complexity in the law, making judges more likely to write
opinions.236 With the embedded federal-question data, the source of
233.
234.
235.
236.

Bennett v. Sw. Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2007).
Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 180, at 1140–41 fig.1
Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1141 n.23 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS
REFORM 358–60 (1985)).

AND
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the upward trend is similarly unclear, but could also reflect the courts’
comfort level with the new precedent,237 their emerging awareness of
new precedent,238 or their desire to explain the application of new
rules.
More important to the litigant-centric clarity model, however, is
the overall small percentage of decisions available in Westlaw: 42%.
Excluding docket research therefore excludes almost three out of
every five decisions. This selection could be harmless. Or selection
could be non-random, producing a biased picture of remand. The relevant question is whether submerged precedent changes the picture of
remand rates. Perhaps, instead of an iceberg, the duck metaphor is
more apt, with a calmly gliding body visible above the surface belies
frenetic paddling below it.
C.

District Court Remand Rates

Grable solidified its jurisdictional test and upheld jurisdiction because the Court held that it would “portend only a microscopic effect
on the federal-state division of labor” to do so.239 The question then
arises whether Grable’s test will portend any measurable effect on the
federal-state balance and district court decision-making—what have
courts done with the flexibility Grable enshrined in the test? The author looked to the rate of remand before and after Grable to help answer these questions.
The Administrative Office of the Courts calculates the rate of removal across all district courts. The removal rate across all courts for
all civil topics has hovered, for the most part, between 11 and 14.3%
for the past decade.240 The Administrative Office does not, however,
generate a rate of remand statistic. So this study aimed to gauge the
rate of remand for federal-question removals by looking first at the
circuits on both sides of the split over Merrell Dow. What it discovered, initially, was that the picture of the remand rate varies based on
where you look.
237. Cf. Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 832 (2010) (arguing that, because Twombly’s new test
was unprecedented, it destabilized the pleading system and that, “In seeking
restabilizing guidance, one naturally looks to procedural experience for some
help,” which was not available).
238. Cf. Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511 (2009)
(identifying phenomenon of reliance on overridden precedents in employment discrimination cases).
239. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 315
(2005).
240. See infra App. 4 (providing the removal rates in all district courts for the years
2000–08).
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Westlaw Remand Rate

Looking only above the surface at the district court decisions in
Westlaw, the rate of remand calculated as of June 13 of each year
shows the movement before and after Grable (June 13, 2005)241 and
Empire (June 15, 2006).242 Figure 2 illustrates that in the year after
Grable, the district courts in the Seventh Circuit, whose restrictive
interpretation Grable rejected, actually increased the percentage of remands. Intuitively, this is surprising because Grable ostensibly
broadened the pool of acceptable federal questions by eliminating the
cause-of-action requirement. The district courts in the Fourth Circuit,
whose interpretation Grable upheld, saw a decline in remands. Again,
this is intuitively surprising because Grable upheld the Fourth Circuit’s more permissive and complex substantiality rule. In the year
immediately following Empire both Circuits’ district courts remanded
a greater portion of claims—the Seventh Circuit’s courts continuing
an upward trend, and the Fourth Circuit’s courts reversing a downward course.243
Figure 2

Considering the possibility that the remand rate reflected a change
in the removal rate, rather than a reaction to Grable and Empire, I
compared the slope of the national removal rate line against the remand rate lines for each year. This is somewhat a comparison of apples to oranges because the removal rate accounts for all substantive
241. Grable, 545 U.S. at 308 (decided June 13, 2005).
242. Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (2006) (decided
June 15, 2006).
243. In the Westlaw sample collected here, the Fourth Circuit district courts remand
cases at a greater rate than the Seventh Circuit district courts, generally, with
the exception of a brief inversion in 2002. This is largely true for the pre-Grable
years, as well, during which the Seventh Circuit maintained a more stringent,
bright-line rule requiring a private right of action for federal-question jurisdiction
and the Fourth Circuit did not. All data on file with author.
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bases across all district courts, but the remand rates account only for
embedded federal-question removals in the Fourth and Seventh Circuit’s district courts. The national removal rate can, however, at least
suggest whether the embedded federal-question remands correspond
to national trends.
The national removal rate, as detailed in Appendix 4, Table 3, has
remained fairly static in recent years. I expected to see a spike in removals after Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,244 issued on May 21,
2007, and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,245 issued on May 19, 2009, as defendants
rightly perceived an increased advantage in dismissing claims from
federal court.246 The federal courts Administrative Office’s removal
data, however, do not bear out that expectation and actually show a
decline in removal and an increase in total filings in Twombly’s first
year, as illustrated in Appendix 4, Table 3.
The author also suspected the national removal numbers might
spike after Grable officially removed the supposed cause of action impediment to jurisdiction. But, the Administrative Office’s data in Appendix 4 show a 2.6% increase in civil filings between 2005 and 2006,
with a 2.5% decrease in the number of removals. The Westlaw remand rates seen in this study, therefore, do not appear to correspond
with the Administrator’s data on removals or civil filings, generally.
2.

PACER Remand Rates

But, perhaps more interestingly, the rate of remand based on decisions available in Westlaw paints a different picture than the submerged precedent in PACER tells about what really happened in the
district courts. The author first isolated the Westlaw results for the
busiest district courts, then compared those results with the courts’
submerged precedent from PACER.
Looking only at the available Westlaw decisions as reflected in Figure 3, the Northern District of Illinois increased remands after Grable
and decreased them after Empire. Then, for the same court, isolating
the submerged precedent in Figure 3, the opposite is true again: remands dropped off sharply following Grable, then shot back up just as
sharply after Empire. Thus, in Illinois’s Northern District, a higher
proportion of decisions to remand ended up in Westlaw, and a higher
244. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
245. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
246. See Hatamyar, supra note 44 (concluding that Twombly has increased dismissal
rates in federal courts, especially dismissals with leave to amend). Compare Patricia W. Hatamyar, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(B)(6)
Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603 (2012) (concluding that Iqbal also increased
dismissals, especially in civil rights cases), with Joe S. Cecil et al., Motions to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After Iqbal, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 21 (Mar.
2011), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.
pdf (concluding that Iqbal’s effect on 12(b)(6) dismissals has been modest).
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proportion of decisions to exercise jurisdiction ended up submerged in
PACER.
Figure 3

The author found these results counterintuitive because she would
have thought that immediately after a new Supreme Court decision,
district courts would have explained their appealable decisions to exercise jurisdiction for potential appellate reviewers, making that outcome more likely to be included in Westlaw. One possibility for the
observed trend is that, because Grable was in its infancy, with little or
no clarifying precedent from the circuit courts, the district courts were
more constrained in applying it, publishing the decisions that would
not be appealed, and submerging the others for the moment. A
slightly higher number of those few submerged, reasoned explanations remanded claims—57.89% of the reasoned opinions remanded
and the remainder exercised jurisdiction.247
3.

True Remand Rates

Looking at the rate of remand among all decisions in Westlaw and
PACER—or the “true” rate of remand—Grable’s clarification appears
to correspond with some effect on the percent of cases remanded, as
illustrated in Figure 4. There further appears to be an uptick in re247. In the Northern District of Illinois PACER sample, eleven of the nineteen “opinions” remanded claims. Interestingly, three of those eleven remand opinions resulted from sua sponte consideration, as opposed to a party’s motion. All of the
remaining eight opinions exercising jurisdiction resulted from remand motions.
Data on file with author. Interestingly, data from the Eastern District of Virginia
shows some trends similar to those observed in the N.D. Il. sample. The Eastern
District of Virginia data are currently under analysis and will be made available
shortly.
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mands after Empire’s reminder to keep Grable “slim.”248 Comparing
the trends in the true rate of remand with the rate of remand observable in Westlaw alone, the trends are nearly inverse from the time certiorari was granted, through the first year after Empire, suggesting
that the inclusion of submerged precedent affects the accuracy of the
remand picture at any given moment in time, especially during times
of uncertainty.
Figure 4

Averaged over the whole time period sampled, however, the
Westlaw remand rate and the true remand rate converged. The
Northern District of Illinois’s Westlaw rate of remand, averaged over
2004–2007 was 57.58% remanded, while the true rate of remand for
the same period was 58.56%. The average rate of submergence remains comparable based on outcome (between decisions to remand
versus those exercising jurisdiction): 29.23% of the remand decisions
from 2004–2007 in the Northern District are available in Westlaw.
From the same period, 30.43% of the decisions not to remand are
available in Westlaw. This suggests that trends in remand rates in
the years immediately after intervening Supreme Court precedent are
more susceptible to bias from submerged precedent than long-term
calculations are.
Although docket data “are more reliable than data drawn from reported decisions,” they still “are hardly immune to biases.”249 This
data analysis currently suffers from small sample size and does not
test or isolate why the submerged and surface precedent tell these
248. Empire was issued June 15, 2006. See Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v.
McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 701 (2006).
249. Burbank, supra note 188, at 617.
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contrasting stories. But it does suggest that it makes a difference
where you look for trends in precedent. My study thus adds yet another increment to the growing body of work exposing the meaningful
differences that exist between the picture of the world taken through
the lens of Westlaw versus court dockets. For purposes of the clarity
mantra’s litigant-predictability goal, the accuracy of prediction depends on where litigants look. “[T]he general unavailability of [submerged] opinions potentially leads to a misconception of the law
itself.”250
Here, the sample size prevents any conclusive statement about
whether Grable meaningfully affected the rate of remand in these
courts. Adding courts to the data sample in the future could possibly
produce a more conclusive analysis. This analysis does, however, illustrate trends in generating precedent, as well as how submerged
precedent may obscure the view of trends in jurisdictional decisionmaking and immediate reactions to new tests.
D.

Appellate Implementation

While the Supreme Court can design rules for the entire federal
system, the circuit courts of appeal further implement or clarify those
rules for their district courts. Appellate opinions have two main implications for the litigant-centric clarity examined here. First, plotting
the district court remand rate around the timing of appellate opinions
illustrates reactions among district courts to appellate clarifications.
Second, the reversal rate for district court opinions offers a measure of
how accurate litigants and district courts have been in predicting the
correct jurisdiction under Grable’s nuanced rule. Examining the few
available appellate opinions in the sampled years shows a rough correspondence with trends in district courts’ decisions on embedded federal questions, while the reversal rates before and after Grable
suggest that courts and litigants have reached more accurate predictions under the flexible reading Grable chose.
1.

Circuit Clarifications

To get an accurate snapshot of the appellate courts’ role in the implementation process, I first had to determine where to look. I designed the study to capture the Fourth and Seventh Circuit appellate
opinions, as well as any intervening Supreme Court precedents adjudicating jurisdiction over removed federal-question cases between
2002 and 2008. The appellate decisions I studied on embedded federal
questions, unlike the district court decisions, all appear on Westlaw.
250. Levin, supra note 45, at 989.
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Review of the circuit courts’ PACER dockets showed no submerged
precedent at the appellate level.251
While the appellate embedded federal-question decisions are comparatively accessible and mostly citable, there are still few of them.
One of the most striking features of the circuit data the author’s
searches gathered was its paucity. Less than 6% of the embedded federal-question decisions are appellate. This tiny ratio of appellate decisions to district opinions on embedded federal-question jurisdiction
may also result from § 1447(d)’s foreclosure of appeal. Section 1447(d)
renders only 41.44% of all the district court decisions reviewable
(based on the 58.56% true rate of remand averaged out over the study
period, calculated above). So the appellate decisions in my sample represent only a small portion of all reviewable decisions.
These few words from the appellate courts may ring loudly in the
district courts’ ears, however. Plotting the remand data from the district courts with the timing of the appellate decisions, in Figure 5,
reveals that district court remand rates change before and after Supreme Court opinions in Grable and Empire, but also before and after
the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Bennett v. Southwest Airlines Co.252
Judge Easterbrook’s panel opinion in Bennett cited both Grable
and Empire in remanding state-law claims alleged to raise questions
about federal aviation standards.253 Curiously, the increase in the remand rate begun after Empire increases somewhat more rapidly, seen
in Figure 5, then declines after a remand opinion from the Seventh
Circuit. The snapshot taken in this sample suggests, then, that clarifying appellate opinions—including those from the Supreme Court—
have some directive influence on district courts’ application of embedded federal-question jurisdictional rules.
2.

Reversal Rates

After figuring out where to look for appellate clarification and examining its impact on remand rates, the author turned to one measure of whether Grable enabled courts and litigants to make more
accurate predictions on jurisdiction: reversal rate.
251. Westlaw and Lexis make all appellate opinions available electronically, with the
exception of those from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. See Levin, supra note
45, at 984–85; Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm
Und Drang over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1429 (2005); Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common Law Disclosure
Duties and the Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795,
1883–87 (2005). Appendix 2 describes observed differences in the publication
rate for the two Circuits sampled, see infra App. 2.
252. Bennett v. Sw. Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2007).
253. Id. Although the opinion did not actually apply Grable’s factors or mention them
by name, Judge Easterbrook held remand was required because the plaintiffs
were challenging airline employee actions, not the federal law. Id. at 910–11.
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Figure 5

A previous study by Jonathan Preis used reversal rate to gauge
clarity, hypothesizing that muddy rules would result in increased reversal rates as district courts guess at how to interpret and apply the
rules.254 Preis studied published circuit opinions adjudicating the
“substantiality” of embedded federal questions, finding a 55% reversal
rate in those opinions during Merrell Dow’s reign through the first
year of the Grable era.255 Comparing this reversal rate to the 12.4%
reversal rate in 2004 in private non-habeas civil cases,256 he concluded that embedded federal-question doctrine “is more lacking in coherence than other areas” of civil law.257 Under this model, a
declining reversal rate through the Grable years may suggest that
Grable infused the doctrine with greater coherence—that it produced
at least greater consistency and perhaps even greater clarity, and vice
versa.
Preis made two inferential steps in drawing his conclusion about
reversal rates and coherence: the first step over the impact of standard of review, and the second over differences in published and unpublished opinions.258 First, Preis compared jurisdictional reversals,
under de novo review, to reversal rates for question under all stan254. Preis, supra note 41, at 165.
255. Id.
256. See Table B-5, U.S. Courts of Appeals—Appeals Terminated on the Merits, by
Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2004, http://www.us
courts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2004/tables/B05
Mar04.pdf.
257. Preis, supra note 41, at 166.
258. Id. at 165–66, 176–77
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dards.259 Preis acknowledged that the 12.4% reversal rate for all private non-habeas cases includes both issues subject to de novo review,
like jurisdiction, and those subject to more deferential standards.260
Although noting that the de novo reversal rate likely is higher than
the 12.4% combined rate, Preis nonetheless concluded that “substantial” federal-question reversal rate is likely much higher than other
cases subject to de novo review.261
Second, Preis’s calculation of 55% reversal relies only on formally
published opinions, while the Administrative Office’s 12.4% statistics
include published and unpublished opinions and orders.262 Further,
the Administrative Office’s statistics for appeals terminated on the
merits show that the publication rate for the terminating opinion was
19% in 2004263 (the statistical year against which Preis measured)
and has been consistently less than that since, dipping to15.9% in
2006 and to 16% in 2010.264 His sample is under-inclusive of those
unpublished opinions. The higher publication rates among the few
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 165–66.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 165–66.
Preis further limited his sample of published cases to those citing either Smith or
Merrell Dow. Id. at 159 n.60, 177 n.132. This limitation likely captured a majority, but not necessarily the entirety of the universe of appellate opinions adjudicating embedded federal questions. My study found that, for example, in the five
years after the Supreme Court announced Grable, twenty appellate cases adjudicating embedded federal-question jurisdiction did not even cite Grable, see infra
App. 3, and at least one opinion, issued two years after Grable, relied solely on
the part of Merrell Dow abrogated by Grable. See Saadat v. Landsafe Flood Determination, Inc., 253 F. App’x. 343, 344 (5th Cir. 2007) (“A complaint that alleges
a violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action, when
there is no private cause of action under the statute, does not state a claim conferring federal question jurisdiction.”). The author’s study also found some cases
before Grable cited neither Merrell Dow nor Smith—including the Sixth Circuit’s
Grable opinion. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 377
F.3d 592, 594–95 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75–76
(1914), and summarizing the “long history of Supreme Court guidance” on embedded federal-question jurisdiction by citing Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., 201
F.3d 754, 759 (6th Cir. 2000); Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 918 (5th
Cir 2001); and Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 1994)).
263. Table S-3, U.S. Courts of Appeals—Types of Opinions or Orders Filed in Cases
Terminated on the Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission During the 12Month Period Ending September 30, 2004, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2004/tables/s3.pdf (showing a total of 81% of unpublished opinions or orders filed in cases were terminated on the merits after oral
hearing or on submission of briefs in 2004).
264. Table S-3, U.S. Courts of Appeals—Types of Opinions or Orders Filed in Cases
Terminated on the Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission on Briefs During
the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2010, http://www.uscourts.gov/us
courts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/tables/S03Sep10.pdf (showing a total of
84% of unpublished opinions or orders filed in cases were terminated on the merits after oral hearing or on submission of briefs in 2010).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-4\NEB405.txt

2012]

unknown

Seq: 53

CLARITY AND CLARIFICATION

24-FEB-12

12:24

553

embedded federal-question cases my study unearthed raises the possibility that the under-inclusion could be between 12% and 23%, as opposed to the 81% suggested by the Administrative Office’s data.265
Preis’s study, though not entirely exhaustive, is still far-reaching and
very extensive.
Preis’s study also benefits from a slightly larger sample, encompassing sixty-seven opinions over twenty years of published opinions
(from 1986–2006) from all circuits.266 In my study, the very small
number of decisions from the Fourth and Seventh Circuits from
2003–2008 makes it impossible to calculate reversal trends with any
confidence. In the Fourth Circuit, only eleven opinions issued over
those six years, with some years having zero decisions by the appellate
court. The Seventh Circuit issued only eight opinions over six years.
With so few decisions, it is difficult to make any useful comparisons
between years (most years had no opinions) or between rates of reversal and publication.
To examine the rate of reversal for embedded federal questions after Grable with a better sample, I reviewed all circuits’ embedded federal-question decisions267 for the 2003–2009 period, a total of only
forty-three opinions. After Grable, the district courts’ decisions were
reversed 52.5% of the time.268 Over time, as illustrated in Figure 6,
the rate of reversal declined after Grable and continued to decline after Empire. Through the entire period, however, reversals increased
slightly.
Some of the appellate decisions reviewing embedded federal-question jurisdictional issues obliquely reviewed district orders remanding
claims. While substantive review is prohibited, appellate courts do
have occasion to look at a remand order while determining whether
the district court made the right decision on an issue of attorney’s
fees.269 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) provides plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees incurred in fighting removal as a remedy for removals deemed by the
district court to have been frivolous. Removals are deemed frivolous
and warranting fees only “where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.”270 On appeal from the
grant or denial of a request for attorney’s fees accompanying a remand, courts review the jurisdictional issue under an abuse of discre265. See supra note 263.
266. Preis, supra note 41, at 166.
267. Note that this is a larger substantive grouping than Preis’s sample. My sample
includes all embedded federal-question decisions and Preis’s sample included
specifically those on the “substantiality” of the federal question.
268. And 72% of the opinions were published. Data on file with author.
269. E.g., Hart v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan, 360 F.3d 674
(7th Cir. 2004).
270. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-4\NEB405.txt

554

unknown

Seq: 54

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

24-FEB-12

12:24

[Vol. 90:501

Figure 6

tion standard.271 Due to this different standard, I did not include the
fee-award opinions in the reversal calculations.
The rate of reversal is but a proxy for the relative clarity and accuracy of predictive data. In my study, that proxy measure suggests a
similar overall reversal rate to what Preis observed, but with some
clarifying influence from Supreme Court guidance in Grable and Empire. More tellingly, the paucity of federal-question jurisdiction decisions from appellate courts suggests relatively few opportunities for
clarifying the doctrine at the appellate level.
The snapshot of Grable’s implementation taken here thus reveals
two trends. First, a majority of the decisions are submerged on dockets, with higher portions submerged immediately after Supreme
Court modification of a rule, and more available opinions following
Circuit court guidance. Second, remand rate changes roughly correspond with appellate clarifications. Thus, a large mass of the predictive precedential data is obscured from litigants and the sharpening
influences of appellate decisions are few and far between.
The next Part prescribes some possible renovations to the clarification process to improve the accuracy of the data available to litigants
(and scholars) and to improve the clarification of the rules themselves.
IV. PROMOTING CLARITY & CLARIFICATION
Looking at federal-question jurisdiction through the eyes of its beholders, namely the district courts applying the rules and the litigants
trying to predict what those district courts will do, the picture taken
271. Id.
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through conventional research obscures the view of what is truly happening with the implementation of jurisdictional rules.
Based on the snapshot taken in this study, three possible solutions
emerge to bring more precedent to surface for clarification, predictive
value, or at least further study: (1) litigants (and scholars) could look
harder; (2) district courts could write more; and (3) appellate courts
could intervene more often. The first solution focuses on what those
trying to foretell or study the application of federal-question jurisdiction rules (litigants and scholars) might do to plumb the depths of submerged precedent. The last two focus on what courts and Congress
might do to promote clarification and the emergence of more clarifying
precedent available through conventional research.
A.

Docket Searches

My study found that 58% of the federal-question jurisdiction decisions remain submerged, only available on PACER.272 This means
that 58% of the decisions are practically invisible to litigants calculating jurisdiction. Commercial database research in at least one of the
two private commercial databases has become not only de rigeur, but
also required to establish professional competence and avoid Rule 11
sanctions.273 So litigants must, and courts should, search for predictive precedent in a database. What they will find there includes all
those opinions selected for inclusion in a national reporter,274 as well
as a large number of decisions not selected for a national reporter, but
still only the tip of the iceberg.
To see the majority of decisions on embedded federal questions, litigants—and those curious folks studying jurisdiction—must take a
dive beneath the surface through the time-intensive search process of
scouring court dockets. Submerged precedent also may make individual case outcomes seem more arbitrary because it obscures the larger
trends in district court jurisprudence and application of jurisdictional
rules.
Just because these submerged decisions are invisible in Westlaw
does not mean that those decisions are not precedent. Our commonlaw system includes as precedent any decisions by previous courts on
272. See supra text accompanying note 217. Several free docket databases have
emerged, but none have PACER’s comprehensiveness and certainly none have
the imprimatur of the federal judiciary.
273. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(4) (authorizing sanctions “include[ing] nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part
or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from
the violation”).
274. There is no “official” reporter for federal district court opinions. West publishes
the Federal Supplement and determines its contents. E.g., Hoffman et al., supra
note 52, at 692 & n.30.
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similar legal issues.275 Thus district court decisions have value as
precedential authority regardless of whether Westlaw or Lexis includes them in their databases, and all appellate opinions issued after
January 1, 2007 are citable.276 In any given litigation, a decision’s
publication status can only enhance its precedential value, not its ability to be cited as authority.
There are reasons that litigants and courts currently do not scour
dockets to bring other submerged precedent above the surface. Those
reasons likely are convention, time, and money. As a matter of convention, courts do not expect parties or their lawyers to undergird legal arguments with docket research. Failure to search dockets (other
than in the instant case and directly-related matters) in addition to
commercial case law databases does not carry the threat of sanctions,
discipline, or malpractice liability.277
Parties may ignore extensive docket research without threat of
punishment, plus conducting that research is time-intensive and expensive. Westlaw and Lexis, although not comprehensive, are mightily accessible. They can successfully charge their hefty fees for
accessing their respective databases because they have revolutionized
legal research by indexing, cross-indexing, and making the full text of
every decision searchable either by natural language or Boolean connections. The databases are intentionally designed to streamline collection of cases based on a range of detailed topics.278 Within those
databases, it is relatively easy to identify the cases one needs to read
to gain command of the precedent on any issue in any jurisdiction.
275. See BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining precedent as “[a] decided
case that furnishes a basis for determining later cases involving similar facts or
issues”).
276. Although some appellate courts for a time tried to tie precedential value to publication, the resulting uproar recently culminated in revision to the federal appellate rules. See FED R. APP. P. 32.1 (2010).
277. Sanctions and malpractice liability also implicate time and money.
278. Courts have recognized the efficiency produced by the commercial databases.
When considering requests for reimbursement of Westlaw and Lexis charges pursuant to fee-shifting statutes, several of the federal circuits have allowed reimbursement because the database services “presumably save money by making
legal research more efficient.” Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962,
975 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (applying Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412); see
also, e.g., Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of Albany,
369 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 2004) (awarding research fees after “agree[ing] that the
use of online research services likely reduces the number of hours required for an
attorney’s manual search, thereby lowering the lodestar”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec.
Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying equitable fund theory in class
action litigation and explaining that “paying” clients “reimburse[ ] lawyers’
LEXIS and WESTLAW expenses, just as [they] reimburse[ ] their paralegal expenses”). But see Jones v. Unisys Corp., 54 F.3d 624, 633 (10th Cir. 1995)
(“[C]osts for computer legal research are not statutorily authorized” under 28
U.S.C. § 1920).
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PACER, by contrast, is comprehensive, but not text-searchable,
multi-jurisdictional, or indexed as finitely, so lugubrious for legal-issue searches, as opposed to case-identifying information. As Hillel
Levin described it, to effectively search PACER, “one would have to
know what to look for in order to find it.”279 Anyone else looking for a
decision on a general topic must wade through all the designated
“written opinions” without the ability to search by particular topic. Or
they must wade through cases filed under that particular topic to see
whether any decision issued. Plus, PACER only offers indexing at a
general level—usually the case genre280 and the statute supplying jurisdiction.281 Because each court maintains its own PACER database,
PACER does not provide trans-jurisdictional (or even between district
and circuit court) searches for a given issue. The topical searches
must proceed court-by-court. And PACER allows detailed searching
within a one-month span only, so the topical searches must also proceed month-by-month. PACER does allow open text searches for particular parties, lawyers, and judges, but these fields do not capture all
the dockets on a particular legal issue.
Until the federal courts decide to make PACER text-searchable
(perhaps for a budget-enhancing fee),282 I am not advocating that litigants routinely search PACER in addition to their chosen private
database. For one thing, I doubt that litigants would care to add
PACER search fees and lawyer time to the already substantial cost of
legal research. I suspect this is so even though the cost of litigating an
erroneous choice of jurisdiction would likely be more than the PACER
fees incurred.283 This also might not make sense because many of the
decisions in PACER do not offer reasoned explanations.
Alternatively, Westlaw could simply include all decisions made
available on PACER.284 This full availability in a text-searchable format would “fully resolve the transparency problem” identified by Hillel Levin.285 Further, it would not require more work for district
judges, “it only requires them to make public that which they already
279.
280.
281.
282.

Levin, supra note 45, at 985.
PACER manual, supra note 186, at 83 app. A. .
Id. at 53 (providing a description of the “cause” field).
Levin, supra note 45, at 1001 (“In an ideal world, opinions on PACER would be
text-searchable and access would be free.”)
283. My PACER bill for this study, for example, was around $400. The bill included
hundreds of docket searches and downloads. As discussed below, PACER does
not charge for every downloaded document, but does charge for a majority of the
available material.
284. Levin, supra note 45, at 1000 (noting that until PACER becomes text-searchable,
“meanwhile, LEXIS and Westlaw should recognize the value of all opinions and
should choose to include them all in their online databases”).
285. See Levin, supra note 45, at 996. Levin also deftly handles potential criticisms of
loading all decisions onto Westlaw. Id. at 997–98.
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write.”286 In many instances, it seems that simply checking a box on
the ECF system could bring these existing opinions to the surface because the commercial databases appear to collect cases by gathering
those tagged as “Written Opinions” in PACER.287
The results of this study do, however, reinforce other commentators’ call for inclusion of dockets in studying district courts and especially in making empirical claims.288
B.

Explained Decisions

Instead of diving beneath the surface for precedent, the surface
level simply could be dropped. This could be accomplished by making
more written decisions worthy of Westlaw, or just by changing the
mechanisms for selecting Westlaw cases.
Only opinions with some explanatory value—albeit sometimes
very slight—make their way into the commercial databases.289 Following this protocol, one way to increase the precedent and predictive
power for litigants would be to require courts to provide reasoned explanations in jurisdictional decisions. This could be accomplished by
amendment to the removal statute, or by creating new local rules or
internal operating procedures calling for reasoned explanation in jurisdictional decisions. The reasoned explanation requirement could be
invoked only at a party’s request, saving district courts the labor of
explaining every jurisdictional decision.
Any proposal increasing the already heavy workload for federal
district courts, however, faces high hurdles. The rarity of Grable federal questions290 diminishes the burden somewhat. As does the phenomenon identified in this study that many judges are already
explaining decisions that simply do not make it to Westlaw. And, jurisdiction jurisprudence and procedure long have empowered courts to
lighten their dockets with jurisdictional remands.291 Courts have
taken them up on the offer. It seems a fair bargain, then to ask for a
286. Id. at 1000.
287. See Correspondence from Kirc J. Breissinger, Dir. of Prod. Planning, LexisNexis,
and Laura Gaddis, LexisNexis Research Specialist, to Elizabeth Y. McCuskey,
Faculty Fellow, Thomas Jefferson Sch. of Law (Aug. 31, 2011) (on file with
author).
288. Burbank, supra note 188; Hoffman et al., supra note 52; Kim et al., supra note
180; Levin, supra note 45.
289. See Hoffman et al., supra note 52, at 693.
290. Dodson, supra note 14, at 57 & n.264; see 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562 (3d ed. 2008) (“[T]he cases raising a
serious question whether jurisdiction exists are comparatively rare.”); Freer,
supra note 16, at 342; Shapiro, supra note 26, at 1841 (arguing that “the overwhelming majority of jurisdictional questions are straightforward and readily resolved”). But cf. William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 MD. L.
REV. 1371, 1389 n.84 (1995) (discussing choice of law).
291. See Wasserman, supra note 171, at 93, 130–32.
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few more hours explaining the decision in exchange for the weeks,
months, even years of work saved by remanding.292 Plus the time invested in explanation would be an investment in precedent—a public
resource.
While the conventional wisdom about Westlaw containing explained decisions may or may not be true, the converse did not always
ring true in my studied sample—not all explained decisions make it
into Westlaw. Many of the submerged precedent are full opinions or
at least include several paragraphs of explanation and citations to authority. Buoying this precedent above the surface could be considerably less work and may simply involve pressing a button.
PACER itself contains an option for judges to designate their decisions as written opinions as opposed to simple orders. In PACER, the
written opinions field “provides a listing of written opinions made by
the court for the date range entered.”293 This field borrows the Federal Judicial Conference’s definition of “written opinion,” encompassing “any document issued by a judge or judges of the court sitting in
that capacity that sets forth a reasoned explanation for a court’s decision.”294 Similar to the process for designating opinions for publication in the Federal Reporter, in PACER the responsibility for
determining which documents meet the definition of “written opinion”
rests with the authoring judge.295
Making available decisions and explanations for so-called “easy”
cases could contribute not only to the accuracy of the picture litigants
have of remand, but also to the perception of how consistent or fair the
application of the jurisdictional rules has been. As William Reynolds
explained, “The success of a system depends in part on how it handles
the easy, as well as the difficult, cases.”296 Showing litigants the
whole picture of remands could bolster perceptions of fairness in any
one case and make individual outcomes seem less anomalous in
context.
Although relatively effortless, this check-the-box solution likely
may not find favor with judges, who likely have a host of reasons for
funneling some decisions into Westlaw and submerging others, most
of which currently are neither accessible nor quantifiable. This checkthe-box solution does not address and cannot account for those
reasons.
292. Yes, in many cases it will be worth it to a litigant to throw the Hail Mary against
long odds for a chance to be in federal court. But greater available precedent may
alter the Hail Mary calculus by raising the specter of fee awards for baseless
removal.
293. PACER Manual, supra note 186, at 61.
294. Id.
295. Id. .
296. Reynolds, supra note 291.
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The first solution risks overburdening litigants, the second solution risks overburdening district courts, so this third solution might be
just right—to permit some targeted, discretionary appellate review of
remand decisions.
C.

Appellate Review

The picture of the implementation process taken in my study supports the clarifying value of targeted discretionary review for remand
orders. The paucity of appellate decisions on embedded federal questions diminishes opportunities for clarification. Yet, those few circuit
opinions’ visible correspondence with changes in district court remand
rates suggests a directive influence exerted at the circuit level. Moreover, the contorted ways in which the federal-question jurisdiction issue came before the appellate courts in my sample reveals both the
extent to which those reviewing courts reach for relief from § 1447(d)’s
prohibition.297
The ideal clarifying mechanism would both offer direction for trial
courts in close cases, and increase the precedent visible to litigants
predicting the proper jurisdiction, even in easy cases. Targeting the
decisions that appear to have the most impact on clarification and district court decisions—appellate opinions—the targeted-review solution ideally would increase opportunities for appellate clarification,
without profoundly increasing the district or appellate courts’ workloads. And, appellate review of remand orders carries the potential
to ferry more submerged precedents into Westlaw, thus improving the
accuracy of the remand picture practically available to litigants.298
Two authors have proposed procedures for appellate review of remand orders that offer solutions relevant to the slim category of federal-question jurisdictional remands. First, Rhonda Wasserman
proposed amending 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) and § 1292(b) to permit circuit-level appellate review of remand orders, at the district courts’ re297. Several appellate opinions on attorney-fee requests after remand have taken the
opportunity to review the propriety of the remand and its basis in law, including
application of Grable’s test. E.g., Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Smith, 507
F.3d 910 (6th Cir. 2007). Indeed, in the sovereign immunity context, Justice
Breyer recently called for an expert review of whether “statutory revision is appropriate” to ease § 1447(d)’s consequences. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 1862, 1869–70 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring).
298. In my circuit-wide sample, 37% of the appellate decisions came from submerged
district court precedents. Increasing the number of clarifications visible to litigants becomes especially important in light of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)’s fee-shifting
provision for good-faith removals held by district courts to be “unjustified” under
contemporaneous precedent. Cf. Garbie v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 211 F.3d 407,
410 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the fee-shifting provision can be invoked by
good-faith removals and does not require conduct rising to the level of sanctions).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-4\NEB405.txt

2012]

unknown

Seq: 61

CLARITY AND CLARIFICATION

24-FEB-12

12:24

561

quest and the circuit courts’ discretion.299 Second, and most recently,
James Pfander proposed direct review of remand orders by the Supreme Court through invocation of the Court’s supervisory powers.300
Based on my study observations, Wasserman’s discretionary circuit review proposal may present the greatest opportunity for clarification by marshalling the directive powers of the circuit courts to
clarify close cases.301 Pfander’s suggestion of Supreme Court original
writ review, offers the path of least resistance by relying on existing
doctrine and circumventing rule changes.302 But Supreme Court original writ review, necessarily focused on correcting clearly erroneous
results, may undo patent injustice, but overlook those close cases so
ripe for clarification.
1.

Discretionary Circuit Review

Wasserman proposed amending 28 U.S.C. § 1447, § 1292, and the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to create a discretionary review
procedure for remand orders certified by the issuing district court.303
As the first step in this certified interlocutory review procedure, she
proposes enacting § 1292(c), allowing district courts to certify remand
orders that “involve[ ] a substantial question as to which there is sufficient ground for difference of opinion to warrant an appeal.”304 This
new section would eliminate § 1292(b)’s additional requirements for
certification that the issue presents a “controlling” question of law
that “would ‘materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation.’”305
Section 1447(d) would likewise be amended to state that a jurisdictional remand is not reviewable except under § 1292(c).306 Then,
§ 1447(c) would be amended to allow a stay of the remand order by
either the district court or court of appeals pending application for appeal and any resulting appeal.307 To reduce delay and disruption
from the certified interlocutory review procedure, Wasserman proposes enacting a new rule to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Rule 5.2, making the petition for leave to appeal due within ten days
of the remand order and committing the decision whether to entertain
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Wasserman, supra note 171, at 83.
Pfander, supra note 175.
Wasserman, supra note 171.
Pfander, supra note 175.
Wasserman, supra note 171.
Id. at 146.
See id. at 147 (explaining that remand orders “rarely, if ever” would materially
advance the litigation’s termination and therefore “control” the outcome) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988)).
306. Id. at 148.
307. Id.
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the appeal to the circuit court’s “sound judicial discretion.”308 If accepted by the circuit court, the remand appeal would take priority
over other “ordinary” civil cases and would forego oral argument.309
Congress intended its preclusion of appellate review to prevent “interruption of the litigation of the merits of a removed cause by prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdiction of the district court to
which the cause is removed.”310 The § 1292(b) option does not erode
this goal of efficiency because it permits appeal of remands only where
the issuing court believes it is a close question and the appellate court
agrees that it should be answered conclusively. And, culturally, the
courts of appeals have exercised their absolute discretion to accept a
very small portion of the interlocutory issues presented for review.311
This § 1292(c) option addresses the undesirable imbalance created
by the judicially-created presumption against jurisdiction, which
shunts the least clear applications—the “doubtful” or debatable cases
for federal-question jurisdiction312—away from the possibility of appellate clarification by placing them in the unappealable category created by § 1447(d). By borrowing § 1292(b)’s formulation of certifiable
issues as “question[s] of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion,”313 § 1292(c) tailors review to those issues
ripe for clarification.
Wasserman’s certified interlocutory review option is thus ideal for
promoting clarification, but more difficult to enact. Pfander’s plan, by
contrast, is easy to implement, but may be less conducive to clarification of close questions.314
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 640 (2006).
See Nystrom v. TREX Co., 339 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that acceptance of § 1292(b) issues lies within the “absolute discretion of this court,” and
that “[s]uch appeals are rarely granted”); In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litig., 903 F.2d 822 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (likening the circuit refusal of § 1292(b)
to Supreme Court denials of certiorari).
312. And some empirical testing found that cases containing non-ministerial orders
were more likely to be federal-question cases. Hoffman et al., supra note 52, at
711.
313. And “that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000); see Taylor v.
PPG Indus., Inc., 256 F.3d 1315, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Mayer, J., dissenting).
314. A third proposition by Andrew Bradt similarly pours new wine into old bottles to
achieve appellate review of remand orders. See Bradt, supra note 77, at 1193.
Bradt argues that Grable’s federalism “veto” element operates like an abstention
doctrine in which district courts remand federal questions that qualify as necessary, disputed, and substantial. Id. at 1156, 1173. Treating those decisions to
remand based on the federalism “veto” abstentions would render that particular
category of decisions reviewable by the appellate courts under existing abstention
doctrine. Id. at 1204. This creative solution aptly describes Grable’s federalism
element, and also prescribes an appropriate response that would aid “general de-
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Supreme Court Supervisory Review

Responding to a “quiet crisis” in appellate review of remand orders
generally, Pfander proposed an elegant solution centered on Supreme
Court review.315 The Pfander plan combines resort to the Supreme
Court’s supervisory powers to correct serious errors via original writ
with a textual interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) as entirely prohibiting other forms of appellate review.316 The solution’s elegance emanates from its focus “not on new legislation or rulemaking,” but
instead on two changes “that lie well within the [Supreme] Court’s
own authority.”317 That is, resort to the Supreme Court’s Article III
original jurisdiction untethers the solution from the process of formally revising § 1447(d) and the solution returns to a bright-line textual reading of that statute:
Through the combination of these two changes . . . the Court would preserve
its ability to correct serious errors at the district court level without entitling
parties to seek review in the intermediate appellate courts in similar cases.
Such an approach would allow the Court to exercise its own judgment in evaluating the seriousness of the error and the need for appellate oversight without obliging Congress or the rulemakers to attempt to specify in advance an
exhaustive catalog of the various kinds of remand . . . errors that might warrant appellate review. Moreover, by foreclosing judge-made exceptions to
§ 1447(d), the Court could confirm the message of Mohawk: the task of crafting exceptions at the intermediate appellate level should be one for the legislative or rulemaking process.318

Pfander acknowledges that “appellate reversal serves an important role in assuring the legality of lower court dispositions” and a rule
foreclosing “all review might invite ever more adventuresome remand
orders (and perhaps eventually lead to a legislative or rulemaking
response).”319
The original writ plan proposes the Supreme Court “revitalize” its
existing All Writs Act power to hear original petitions for mandamus
to correct serious district court errors, eliminating the necessity of intermediate appellate review.320 This mechanism would allow review
even of remands for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, which are currently beyond the circuit courts’ power.321 The Supreme Court would
thus offer clarification by directly addressing a claimed district court

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

velopment of the doctrine in order to provide district courts more guidance.” Id.
at 1204–05. Because this abstention solution would apply only to a small subclass of Grable remands, however, it offers diminished clarification potential.
Pfander, supra note 175, at 493.
See id. at 500–01.
See id. at 499.
Id. at 501 (referring to Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 605–07
(2009)).
Id. at 509 n.83.
Id. at 514.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000).
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error in remanding, but only in selected cases. The original writ procedure comes with a screening mechanism in the form of a preliminary petition for leave, which functions much like the highlydiscretionary certiorari petition review.322 This discretionary escape
valve permitting only serious errors to pass into review would control
the Supreme Court’s docket, and function somewhat similarly to
§ 1292(b)’s certification.
The Supreme Court’s original writ proceedings, in contrast to
§ 1292(b) certification, carry with them mandamus’s high hurdles to
review. Mandamus requires a showing of extraordinary injustice, permitting review only of “serious mistakes” or clear and “significant” errors—traditionally ones that lack justification.323 As a matter of
docket-management, Supreme Court Rule 20.1 describes the petition
for original writ review as a matter committed to the Court’s discretion and “sparingly exercised.”324 Pfander explains that under the
mandamus standards for original writ review, few remands would
present issues “grave enough to warrant intervention,” and the “extraordinary nature of mandamus relief” could send a message to practitioners that the Court will entertain only the “clearest cases” of
error.325
Even though the two standards differ in scope and severity, their
practical application might even out the workload. That is, despite
the more generous standard in § 1292(b), each circuit court may actually exercise its § 1292(b) powers as infrequently as the Supreme
Court exercises its supervisory powers.326 And Pfander suggests that
“the [Supreme] Court could still contribute to the development of the
law at the district court level through the issuance of supervisory
writs,” allowing the Court “to stay in touch with developments at the
district court level.”327
V. CONCLUSION
It is time to embrace a fresh perspective on clarity in jurisdictional
rules, both in theory and in practice. Focusing on the theoretical design behind the rules, bright lines can undermine the purpose of jurisdiction by denying a federal forum for adjudicating substantial
questions of federal law embedded in state-law claims. Despite
weighty rhetoric favoring bright-line rules and clarity for clarity’s
sake, the Supreme Court in Grable unanimously seemed to agree by
322. Id. at 516.
323. See id. at 515–16, 532 n.188; Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S.
336, 352–53 (1976).
324. See SUP. CT. R. 20.1; Pfander, supra note 175, at 516, 518–20.
325. Pfander, supra note 175, at 516 n.116.
326. See id. at 533 n.193.
327. Id. at 541.
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rejecting a bright-line rule in favor of a nuanced one when crafting
Grable’s unified test for embedded federal-question jurisdiction.
Practically speaking, the implementation of Grable’s nuanced rule
has not resulted in rampant reversals or a deluge of cases proceeding
in the federal courts. That is, the nuanced rule has not wreaked havoc
upon the federal workload by infusing the rules with flexibility. If anything, it has had the opposite effect, as district judges wield that discretion against exercising jurisdiction. Similarly, the nuanced rule
has not engendered rampant confusion between district and appellate
courts. While reversals for embedded federal-question decisions remain higher than the average for all private civil cases, Grable’s jurisdictional rule has driven the reversal rate down, not up.
In addition to obscuring the purpose of embedded federal-question
jurisdiction, the focus on the design of rules has also occluded the vision of jurisdictional clarity’s desired effect: litigant predictability. By
turning the focus to jurisdictional clarity through litigants’ eyes, the
implementation and clarification processes acquire greater significance than the theoretical debate over the inherent design of the
rules. Viewed through a litigant-centered perspective, significant procedural obstacles prevent conventional research from capturing the
sharpest picture of what courts are doing to implement Grable’s rule.
The large mass of precedent submerged on courts’ dockets changes the
picture of the remand rate, and contains valuable, reasoned precedents. Further, the foreclosure of appeal for all jurisdictional remands
renders the invaluable opportunities for appellate clarification in close
cases few and far between.
If jurisdictional clarity is to truly serve its litigant-centered goal,
then we must permit targeted, discretionary review of district court
remand orders. Review will not only exert a directive influence on the
clarification process, but also may improve litigant perceptions of the
fairness and consistency in how those rules are applied to them.
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VI. TABLES & APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1:
SELECTION CRITERIA

FOR

SAMPLE DISTRICT COURTS

The study presented here examines a very modest sample of district court decisions within the Fourth and Seventh Circuits. The author selected the busiest district court within each Circuit for
sampling based on the United States Courts Administrative Office
statistics. The author chose the district court with the highest number of private civil cases filed, as averaged over the fiscal years
2002–2008.328
In the Seventh Circuit, the Northern District of Illinois, which includes Chicago, was the busiest by far, as detailed in Table 1’s comparison between the Northern District of Illinois and the next busiest
court in the Circuit, the Southern District of Indiana.329
Table 1: Busiest Districts in the 7th Circuit

District

Private
civil cases
Yearly
2002
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 TOTAL Average

N.D.IL.

8,617

9,090 9,429 7,224 6,600 6,638 6,699

54,297

7,756.71

S.D.Ind.

2,602

2,459 2,673 2,462 2,274 2,141 2,185

16,796

2,399.43

In the Fourth Circuit it was a closer race for busiest court between
the Eastern District of Virginia and the District of South Carolina, as
detailed in Table 2.330 The calculation excluded fiscal year 2004, in
which the District of South Carolina had an outlying 22,532 filings,
more than 19,000 of which were statutory actions filed by two plaintiffs related to personal property damage that involved high-risk mortgage loans to consumers.331 The calculation also excluded fiscal year
2002, in which the Eastern District of Virginia had an outlying 9,415
filings due to a surge in asbestos cases filed there. The more than
328. See, e.g., Table C-3, U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of
Suit and District during the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2002, http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2002/ta
bles/c03mar02.pdf (providing the number of civil cases filed during the twelve
month period ending in March of 2002).
329. See, e.g., id.
330. See, e.g., id.
331. See2004 Judicial Business, ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS 15–16 (2004), http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2004/front/JudicialBusi
ness.pdf. These filings accounted for as much as an 83 percent increase in filings
in the district and were so numerous that they affected the national civil filing
rate, as well. 2005 Judicial Business, ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS 11 (2005),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2005/front/judicial
business.pdf.
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5,000 asbestos cases filed in the E.D.Va. in FY 2002 accounted for 22%
of the cases filed in all district courts that year.332 Excluding these
unrepresentative years, the Eastern District of Virginia edged out the
District of South Carolina.333
Table 2: Busiest Districts in the 4th Circuit

District

Private
civil cases
2003

2005

2006

2007

2008

TOTAL

Yearly
Average

E.D.Va.

4,109

3,587

3,329

2,927

2,528

16,480

3,296.00

D.S.C.

3,217

3,263

2,917

3,014

4,004

16,415

3,283.00

APPENDIX 2:
REMAND RATE CODING INFORMATION

AND

VARIABLE

All of the information and processes used to search for decisions, to
identify relevant cases, and to code their individual characteristics are
set forth in a codebook, available upon request.
To capture embedded federal question decisions in removed cases,
the author searched Westlaw for the following search terms: REMOV!
“ARISE UNDER” & REMAND! & “1441” “REMOVAL JURISDICTION” & (“FEDERAL QUESTION” “FEDERAL QUESTIONS”). The
author performed the searches and distributed the resulting lists to
her coders.
Each of the decisions fitting the substantive and jurisdictional criteria outlined in Part III was coded for identifying information and a
few major aspects of substance. Because this Article examines clarification and the implementation process for a nuanced jurisdictional
rule, the coding fields and variables for this study capture the rate of
remand over time (by coding the date and outcome of the decision), the
reversal rate over time (by coding appellate outcomes), and the relative availability and utility of the decision to litigants making predictions (by coding where the decision can be found and whether it
contains a reasoned explanation). The fields relevant to this analysis
are included in the following list, with a description of the values used
for each field noted in parentheses.334
332. See FY 2002 Admin. Off. Jud. Bus. Ann. Rep., at 17 (2002).
333. If those outlier years are included, the D.S.C. has the highest average at 6,118
and the E.D.Va. has the second-highest average at 4,254. If only those singlesubject cases are excluded in 2002 and 2005, then the E.D.Va. has the highest
average at 3,540 and the D.S.C. has the second highest average at 3,404.
334. The small numbers of results for appellate cases in the sampled jurisdictions
made meaningful analysis of rates and their fluctuations over time nearly impos-
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Source: (Westlaw or PACER)

All decisions available on Westlaw were coded as Westlaw. The
PACER results were purged of those entries also available on Westlaw
before being entered into the database. So those decisions available
only on PACER were coded in the database as PACER. The source
field captures the practical question of where a litigant or court could
obtain an electronic copy of the decision. I treated this field separately
from the question whether the decision was included in the Federal
Reporter, Supplement, or Rules Decisions, which is captured in the
“Publication” field, described below.
2.

Case Name and Citation: (caption and citation)

Cases found in Westlaw included the most formal citation available. If a case was published in the Federal Supplement, the author
used that citation. If a case was not included in the reporter, I used
the “WL” electronic reporter citation. PACER cases used the docket
number as a citation.
3.

Court: (the court issuing the decision)

4.

Date of Decision: (month, day, year)

5.

Depth: (order or opinion)

We coded first for the amount of explanation in the decision. We
coded as “order” those decisions simply announcing the outcome without stating the reasons for it and/or referring only to the reasons
stated in briefs or at argument. Decisions that also stated the legal
rule, cited authority, and gave an explanation of the rule’s application
to the instant case were coded as “opinion.”335
sible. To get a better snapshot of clarity through reversal rates, the author conducted additional sampling and coding for appellate cases in all circuits, as
explained above in subsection III.D.2 on reversal rates. Coding and analysis for
additional types of information, including type of case, basis of decision, judge
characteristics, reporter publication, and procedural contexts is on-going as of the
date of this Article and will be the subject of future work.
335. In selecting these values, I depart slightly from Docketology’s “simple definition”
that an “ ‘opinion’ is any judicial disposition on Westlaw or Lexis” and “an ‘order’
is any disposition that is not.” See Hoffman et al., supra note 52, 693. Similarly,
Hillel Levin defined “opinion” with reference to the decision’s import and thus
includes every decision under the term “opinion.” Levin, supra note 45 at 982–83.
Levin’s definition is not especially relevant to my study because it is not reflective
of PACER practices or the clarifying value of precedent—while “important” for
counting, e.g., id. at 983, unreasoned or unexplained decisions offer little clarification of how the rule applies. The author’s study results support her definition,
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Outcome: (remanded, not remanded, partially remanded)

The outcome field focused solely on the outcome of the federalquestion jurisdictional issue. So, for example, an opinion deciding initially that federal-question jurisdiction existed, then moving on to determine that the federal claims should be dismissed and the
remaining state claims remanded for lack of supplemental jurisdiction
would be coded as “not remanded” because it decided not to remand
based on lack of federal-question jurisdiction.
The author employed four research assistants to complete this coding for the 553 total Westlaw cases identified by our searches, as well
as those dockets identified as containing a decision on embedded federal-question jurisdiction. During the seven months in which my research assistants coded cases, we met regularly to discuss our results.
As each assistant completed a coding assignment, I audited the results and discussed lessons and coding corrections with the whole
group.
Throughout the project, coders blindly coded portions of one another’s assignments and the author compared the results to gauge inter-coder agreement, using Cohen’s kappa.336
APPENDIX 3
CIRCUIT COURT PUBLICATION & CITATION RESTRICTIONS
While all appellate opinions are available in the commercial
databases, local rules at the circuit court level limit opinions’ precedential value based on publication status. Until January 1, 2007, the
circuits’ respective local rules dictated whether and to what extent litigants could cite unpublished opinions.337 Responding to litigant frustration and academic criticism,338 the Advisory Committee on the
as described below, because she found many “reasoned explanations” available
only on PACER.
336. For each coding variable described in this Appendix, the kappa was 0.75 or
higher. The author also checked for agreement in the coding of cases for selection
into or exclusion from the database and found higher than 0.7 agreement.
337. See generally Robert Timothy Reagan, Citing Unpublished Federal Appellate
Opinions Issued Before 2007, FED. JUD. CENTER, (Mar. 9, 2007), http://www.us
courtsfjc.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Unpub_Opinionspublic/pdf.nsf/look
up/citrules.pdf/$file/citrules.pdf.
338. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 218; see also Lawrence J. Fox, Those Unpublished Opinions: An Appropriate Expedience or an Abdication of Responsibility?, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1215, 1216 (2004) (explaining that sometimes
unpublished cases are the only supporting authority for a client’s case); Comm.
on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Meeting of June 17-18, 2004, Washinton, D.C.:
Minutes, U.S. COURTS, 9 (June 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/us
courts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/ST06-2004-min.pdf (“One lawyer-member
suggested that local non-citation rules pose a serious perception problem for the
courts of appeals. He said that it is difficult to explain to a client that a court has
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Federal Appellate Rules proposed an amendment to Rule 32.1,
preventing circuits from prohibiting citation to unpublished decisions.
The Supreme Court adopted the new rule in April 2006, and the federal rules now permit litigants to cite all circuit decisions issued after
January 1, 2007, but preserve the circuits’ local rules for decisions
before that date.339
For decisions before January 1, 2007, the Fourth Circuit local rule
restricts citation,340 and the Seventh Circuit local rule flatly prohibits
it.341 As detailed in Tables 3 and 4, the Seventh Circuit somewhat
makes up for its prohibitory rule by publishing its opinions at a rate
25% higher than the federal circuit court average (42.7% publication
in the Seventh Circuit, compared with 16.97% nationally).342 While
the Fourth Circuit has the more lenient rule between the two, it also
has a much lower publication rate of 7.08%, which is 9.89% lower than
the national circuit average.343
Table 3: Federal Appellate Court Publication Rates344
YEAR

Publish Rate

2005

18.4

2006

15.9

2007

16.5

2008

18.2

2009

16.8

2010

16

AVERAGE

339.
340.
341.

342.
343.
344.

16.97

decided a similar case in the recent past, but the case cannot be cited to the same
court.”),
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 (2007).
See 4TH CIR. R. 32.1 (allowing citation only if “there is no published opinion that
would serve as well” for a material issue in the case); see also Reagan, supra
note10 to App. 3.
See 7TH CIR. R. 32.1 (prohibiting citation “except to support a claim of preclusion
(res judicata or collateral estoppel) or to establish the law of the case”); see also
Foa, supra note 192 (expressing skepticism of publication plans); Reagan, supra
note10 to App. 3 (noting that the Seventh Circuit prohibits citations to unpublished opinions and the Fourth Circuit discourages citations to unpublished
opinions).
See infra Tables 3 & 4.
See infra Tables 3 & 4. The Fourth Circuit’s unusually low publication rate is
documented in Reynolds & Richman, supra note 218.
Stats for this table were compiled from the Administrative Office of the Courts.
E.g., Table S-3, U.S. Courts of Appeals—Types of Opinions or Orders Filed in
Cases Terminated on the Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission on Briefs
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2005, http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2005/tables/s3.pdf (providing the
statistics for the fiscal year of 2005).
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Table 4: Fourth & Seventh Circuit Publication Rates345
CA4 YEAR

Publish Rate %

% Difference

2005

8.2

−10.2

2006

6.3

− 9.6

2007

7

− 9.5

2008

7.7

−10.5

2009

6.3

−10.5

2010

7

− 9

TOTAL

7.08

− 9.88

CA7 YEAR

Publish Rate %

%Difference

2005

43.4

25

2006

35.6

19.7

2007

45

28.5

2008

51.1

32.9

2009

40.9

24.1

2010

40.2

24.2

TOTAL

42.70

25.73

Because this study covers five years in the era of restrictive local
rules, the author examined the publication status for the sample of
embedded federal-question decisions to see whether these restrictions
impacted the embedded federal-question precedent available for citation. In the Seventh Circuit, only one of the eight decisions issued in
the six years studied was excluded from the Federal Supplement,346
and the one unpublished embedded federal-question opinion was from
2002, making it unciteable as precedent. Although the eight-opinion
sample of embedded federal-question decisions is a very small one, its
publication rate of 87.5% is more than double the Seventh Circuit’s
average overall publication rate of 42.5%.
In the Fourth Circuit, three of the eleven embedded federal-question decisions in the study period were excluded from the Federal Sup345. Stats for this table were compiled from the Administrative Office of the Courts.
E.g., Table S-3, U.S. Courts of Appeals—Types of Opinions or Orders Filed in
Cases Terminated on the Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission on Briefs
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2005, http://www.us
courts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2005/tables/s3.pdf (providing the
statistics for the fiscal year of 2005).
346. See Covington v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 51 Fed. App’x 992 (2002).
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plement,347 and two of those three were issued prior to the 2007 rule
change, rendering them unciteable. The 72.7% publication rate observed in this small sample of embedded federal-question decisions
dwarfs the Fourth Circuit’s overall average publication rate of
7.08%.348
APPENDIX 4:
REMOVAL RATE

IN

ALL DISTRICT COURTS

Table 5: Civil Filings and Removals in all District Courts
(2000–2008)349
2000
Total Civil
Filings
Total Filings
Rate Change

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

259,517 250,907 274,841 252,962 281,338 253,273 259,541 257,507 267,257
−0.3

−3.3

9.5

−7.9

11.2

−10.0

2.6

−0.8

3.8

Removals

30,194

30,683

55,480

36,228

34,443

30,174

29,437

30,282

30,065

Removal % of
Total

11.63% 12.23% 20.19% 14.32% 12.24% 11.91% 11.34% 11.76% 11.25%

Removal Rate
Change

0.9

1.6

80.8

−20.3

−4.9

−12.4

−2.5

2.9

−0.7

The great spike in removals in 2002 is likely due to the onslaught
of asbestos cases filed in that year. See supra note 209.

347. See In re Mills, 287 F. App’x 273 (2008); Freeman v. Duke Power Co., 114 F.
App’x 526 (2004); Forrest v. Transit Mgmt. of Charlotte, 93 F. App’x 577 (2004).
348. See supra note 344.
349. Compiled from data provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
See, e.g., Table S-7, U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Filed, by Origin, During
the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 2004 Through 2008, http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2008/tables/S07Sep08.pdf
(providing total civil filings for years 2004–08); Table S-7, U.S. District Courts—
Civil Cases Filed, by Origin, During the 12-Month Periods Ending September
30, 2000 Through 2004, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/Judicial
Business/2004/tables/s7.pdfhttp://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/Judicial
Business/2005/tables/s3.pdf (providing total civil filings for years 2000–04).

